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PREFACE
This study is not 
trade unions in China, 
how changes in Chinese 
orientations over time 
toward trade unions.
an organizational or sociological work on 
It is primarily a case study illustrating 
Communist Party political and economic 
have been reflected in the Party's policy
The All-China Federation of Trade Unions and its branch organs 
ceased to function in December 1966, victims of the Great Prole­
tarian Cultural Revolution. Only in 1973, following the rebuilding 
of the Party and the subsequent rehabilitation of mass organiza­
tions such as the Young Communist League, have trade unions reap­
peared. Thus, union policy in China continues to mirror broader 
policy developments.
Much of the work for this study began with my doctoral disser­
tation, "Trade union in Communist China: A functional comparison
with the Soviet Union" (University of California, Berkeley, 1968) 
under the chairmanship of Professor James Townsend. While preparing 
the final draft, I received encouragement from Professor Charles 
Hoffman. Research in Hong Kong was supported by a travel grant 
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Chinese labor policy, like any major governmental policy, has 
resulted from complex interaction between elite priorities and ob­
jective conditions. Like the Bolsheviks of fifty years ago and 
the elites in the emerging nations of the past decades, the Chinese 
Communists came to power in an underdeveloped country with a rela­
tively small and very immature work force, a low level of technical 
development and a lack of investment capital. In terms of both 
industrial base and reservoir of available skills, conditions in 
China in 19^9 were significantly worse than conditions in Russia 
in 1917. The Chinese also faced a high ratio of population to 
arable land and a high rate of population growth. Investment cap­
ital would have to come from agriculture, as in the Soviet Union, 
but the margin between production and subsistence consumption was 
already extremely thin.l The Chinese Communists also came to power 
committed to "lean on one side" and to look to the Soviet Union as 
a model for building a national industrial economy. Chinese labor 
policy therefore shared many characteristics with labor policy in 
the Soviet Union and other developing countries. The Chinese even 
copied directly from the Soviets, initially adopting their general 
industrialization strategy and formal trade union structure. But 
even these adoptions were soon modified to meet the priorities of 
China's leaders, especially Mao Tse-tung himself. A study of 
Chinese labor policy illustrates primarily its uniqueness.
Chinese political and economic policy has differed signifi­
cantly from the Soviet model. One basic reason for this has been 
a difference of approach to the problem of simultaneously indus­
trializing, socializing and communizing an underdeveloped country.
1
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For Marx, the proletariat was to be the vehicle of the communist 
revolution because of its significant position in a capitalist so­
ciety. The proletariat was that class which had become "proletar- 
ianized," i.e., torn from traditional, feudal and familial rela­
tions, recruited into an industrial work force, and therefore 
intensely deprived both objectively and subjectively. When the 
proletariat's situation became desperate, when it had nothing to 
lose but its chains, it would overthrow capitalist society and 
substitute a communist one. For Marx, looking at Western Europe 
in the nineteenth century, industrialized capitalist society was 
the given, communist revolution was the predicted consequence.
In China, like in Russia, the communist revolution came before 
the process of proletarianization. The creation of an industrial 
work force had barely begun, and the revolution itself was based 
on the peasantry. The purpose of the revolution was to eliminate 
the remnants of traditional family and feudal relationships and 
to replace the existing regime with one committed to industriali­
zation and modernization as a prelude to communism. This meant 
that the process of proletarianization had to be carried out after 
the revolution. Thus, potential alienation of the workers by the 
very process of proletarianization has intensified the problem of 
national integration and elite legitimization. The regime has 
attempted to educate the workers to an acceptance of communism as 
a world view, not only as a prerequisite to achieving communism 
but also to legitimize the leadership role of the Chinese Commu­
nist Party itself.
In theory both the Chinese and the Russians have assumed that 
the communization of man is facilitated by objective conditions, 
thus the need for socialist industrialization. They have also 
assumed that the rate of industrialization is directly affected 
by the level of political consciousness among the people, thus the 
need for political education and indoctrination. But in practice 
the two regimes have had different priorities. In Russia Stalin
3
concentrated on industrialization. Only after their economic base 
had been secured did Soviet leaders make a concerted effort to com­
bine education with industrialization. Under Stalin communization 
efforts were largely ignored, and efforts at political socializa­
tion were limited to those citizens essential to industrialization, 
like factory managers, engineers, and model workers. Their social­
ization was not by political education so much as it was by 
"economism," the capitalistic method of giving them a material 
stake in society. The rank and file workers were neither commu- 
nized nor socialized but were controlled by labor discipline and, 
ultimately, by fear of the secret police and forced labor camps.
In these terms, the Soviet thaw of the fifties consisted largely 
of extending economism to the rank and file workers.
In China, on the other hand, Mao has seemed to assume that in 
the final analysis political education holds the highest priority 
and is itself the primary motive-power for industrialization. This 
assumption reflects Mao's so-called Yenan thinking, that the Chi­
nese masses, properly educated politically and properly mobilized, 
can overcome all obstacles. To a large extent, the Chinese have 
attempted to communize first, and thereby replace Soviet economism 
and compulsion with active commitment. They have, therefore, 
attached great Importance to various forms of political education, 
especially participatory forms of political education.
This emphasis relates directly to Mao's redefinition of the 
concept of class into terms of ideological orientation. In the 
early fifties, the Party's propaganda emphasized national unity 
while playing down class struggle. Many Party leaders had not 
been workers or of worker origin, and the revolution itself was 
peasant-based. More significantly for the fifties, the Party 
needed the assistance of the national bourgeoisie and the intel­
lectuals. The bourgeoisie as a class, defined in terms of its 
relation to the mode of production, was destined to disappear, and 
the proletariat was extolled as the leading class in Chinese
k
society. But the emphasis on unity was clear. To oversimplify, 
during that early period all individuals, regardless of class ori­
gin, with the correct ideological orientation could be included in
the people. From 1956 to 1958 the "transition to socialism" was 
2accelerated, and the emphasis shifted from unity to struggle.
During the earlier period, classes in the Marxian sense including 
a bourgeoisie in private control of most of China's industry still 
existed, but there was also a need for unification and cooperation 
to get industrialization underway. By 1957 the bourgeoisie no 
longer existed in the Marxian sense, but Mao insisted on the need 
for struggle against bourgeois thinking within the remaining classes 
and within individual minds. According to Mao, everyone was subject 
to bourgeois thinking, regardless of class origin. Therefore, con­
tradictions might develop within classes or among the people or in 
the thinking of individuals.
This is not the place to reconsider all the partial and pos-
3sible reasons for Mao's change in emphasis. However, two major 
implications of that change should be noted. First, it changed 
the relationship between ideology and the Party organization. As 
Mao's statements during the Cultural Revolution can be recon­
structed, if ideology and not class origin is the key, then Mao's 
thought stands above the Party. Party leadership must be justi­
fied by its performance toward realizing Mao's vision of the new 
China; it cannot be justified in class terms by the Party's defi­
nition as vanguard of the proletariat. Party members are, in 
fact, particularly susceptible to bourgeois thinking because their 
leadership positions can easily lead to entrenchment and thus to 
conservatism or revisionism. In this sense, the Cultural Revolu­
tion was an expression of Mao's rejection of national integration 
based on role interdependency and material goal orientations in 
favor of what might be called integration through ideological 
agreement created by common struggle. In labor policy this posi­
tion has been reflected in Mao's preference for political educa­
tion and struggle over material incentives, and for mass
5
participation over professionalism, expertise and organizational 
entrenchment.
Second, the change in emphasis from unity to struggle and the 
persistent tension between those two emphases have affected and 
changed the nature of political education. Political education 
has had two distinct themes since 19^9. One theme has been nation­
al integration, patriotism, and the like. The second theme has 
been more ideological, i.e., Marxism-Leninism and, in the sixties, 
Mao Tse-tung's Thought. The first kind of political education has 
been directed toward national integration or socialization in the 
traditional sense, while the second kind has been directed toward 
the communization of the Chinese people. Ideally, both work to­
ward the same or overlapping purposes, but in practice this has 
not always been the case. The workers have been a prime target 
for both types of educational effort, and the differences and 
changes in emphasis discussed here are therefore conspicuous in 
Chinese labor policy.
In China trade union activity is a part of the regime's labor 
policy. In this study, however, an effort has been made to con­
centrate on the unions. Chinese labor policy has reflected chang­
ing circumstances over time, apparent changes in Mao's policy 
orientations, and the tides of fortune in Mao's conflict with other 
Party leaders on the issues of ideology versus organization and 
politics versus professionalism. It has also reflected the devel­
opment of professionalism among union officials and the Party's 
response to that development.
The aim of this study is chronological, to offer a general
picture of trade union performance as it developed over time. It
should be remembered, of course, that the periodization is only
4approximate and general. The years 1956-1958 have been suggested 
as a dividing point in the history of the Communist regime, with 
certain emphases characterizing the two periods before and after 
that point. But policy emphasis has also oscillated during each
6
of those two periods. For purposes of analysis the twenty-odd-year 
history of the Communist regime is divided here into seven periods: 
an early period of political and economic consolidation and reor­
ganization; the period of China's first five-year plan and adoption 
of the Soviet industrialization strategy and policy of one-man 
management; the period from 1955 to 1957. when socialization of in­
dustry necessitated and the hundred flowers policy made public a 
major debate on the role of the unions; the period of the Great 
Leap Forward at the end of the fifties; a period of recovering from 
the disastrous effects of that campaign during the early sixties; 
the Cultural Revolution; and the period since then.
Three major patterns or models of union performance are dis- 
cernable in those six periods. During three of them Chinese unions 
have had several functions: 19^9"1952, 1955-1957, and 1961-1963.
Although production was at the center of their work, they were also 
actively engaged in political education, administrative work, and 
communication between the Party and the workers. The second model 
appeared during the first five-year plan; under the Soviet policy 
of one-man management union performance was largely limited to the 
single task of promoting production. The third model character­
ized the Great Leap Forward and, with modifications, the early part 
of the Cultural Revolution. During those two periods reliance on 
political education was greatly intensified, and the unions were 
functionally supplanted by the Party during the Great Leap Forward 
and completely supplanted by "revolutionary rebel" groups during 
the Cultural Revolution. Since the trade unions have reappeared 
only very recently characterization of the seventh period is par­
ticularly tentative. Basically, however, current policy fits the 
third model.
Since the main presentation is chronological, an introductory 
note is added here on each of the major functions assigned to the 
unions: transmission belt between the Party and the workers, po­
litical education, production, and administrative functions.
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Chinese Unions as Transmission Belt
The transmission belt role of the unions in Communist countries 
involves the entire question of Party-union relations. It is there­
fore at the center of union policy. In the Soviet Union, between 
1917 and 1920, the question of union independence was openly debated. 
Lenin's decision was that the unions not be formally incorporated 
into the state bureaucracy, but that they be guided by the Party 
from above and led by the Party from within through the leadership 
position of Party members:
In its work, the Party relies on the trade 
unions....which are formally nonparty. Act­
ually, all the directing bodies of the vast 
majority of the unions and primarily, of 
course, of the...A11-Russian Central Council 
of Trade Unions, consist of Communists and 
carry out all the directives of the Party.
Thus, on the whole, we have a formally non- 
Communist, flexible and relatively wide and 
very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means 
of which the Party is closely linked up with 
the class and with the masses, and by means of 
which, under the leadership of the Party, the 
dictatorship of the class is exercised. With­
out close contact with the unions...it would, 
of course, have been impossible for us to 
govern the country and to maintain the dicta- 
torship.7
The Chinese position has been similar, without the initial period 
of open debate. Unions have been considered a "good lieutenant" 
to the Party. The Party is considered the highest organ or van­
guard of the working class; unions are considered the organiza­
tional structure of the working class and a link between the Party
and the workers. Therefore, the unions must work under the guid-
0ance and leadership of the Party. The unions were formally 
established as workers' organizations with the obligation of de­
fending workers' interests, but workers' interests have been iden­
tified with the development and policies of the "workers' state."
On the one hand.
It is the duty of trade unions to protect the 
interests of workers and staff members, to
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ensure that the managements or owners ef­
fectively carry out labor protection, labor 
insurance, wage standards, factory sanita­
tion and safety measures as stipulated in 
the laws and directives, and to take meas­
ures for improving the material and cultural 
life of the workers and staff members.9
On the the other hand.
In order to safeguard the fundamental inter­
ests of the working class...(the trade unions 
must) a) Educate and organize the masses of 
workers and staff members to support the laws 
and decrees of the People's Government, (and) 
carry out the policies of the People's Gov­
ernment in order to consolidate the people's 
State power which is led by the working 
class; b) educate and organize the masses 
of workers and staff members to adopt a new 
attitude toward labor, to observe labor dis­
cipline, to organize labor emulation cam­
paigns and other production movements in 
order to ensure the fulfillment of the pro­
duction plans.
A primary instrument of Party control over the unions and 
other mass organizations, in China as in the Soviet Union, has been 
the leadership role of individual Party members within the union 
hierarchy. All of the top officials of the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU) since 19^9 have been Party members of high 
standing except Chu HsQeh-fan, who before 19^9 had led the non- 
Communlst but Leftist Chinese Association of Labor in Nationalist 
China. Perhaps more importantly, this policy is observed even at 
the local levels. Control within the union structure itself has 
been hierarchical, reflecting the leadership principle of democra­
tic centralism. Union members were organized by enterprise or 
institution, enterprise unions were organized into national unions 
by industry, and national industrial unions were coordinated under 
the leadership of a single national congress.^' The congress was 
to be convened only every four years, however, and active leader­
ship was to be exercised by the Executive Committee and especially 
the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the All-China Federa­
tion of Labor (ACFL; renamed ACFTU at the Seventh Trade Union
9
Congress in 1953). In fact, no national congress has been convened 
since 1957.
In practice Party policy on union structure has been flexible, 
and two distinct organizational structures have been emphasized at 
different times. One is the vertical organizational structure of 
the industrial unions, as just described. The other is a regional 
union organization, horizontal in structure and closely tied to 
the provincial and municipal Party and government apparatus. When 
combined with other policies, this duality of organizational struc­
ture has had a significant effect on the unions. When the Chinese 
have emphasized "politics in command," the industrial sector has 
undergone organizational decentralization, putting effective lead­
ership in the hands of local and regional Party committees rather
12than central ministries. The situation within the unions has 
been similar. During the early years of Communist rule the indus­
trial unions were still weak, and regional union organs had the 
advantage. The industrial union system was formally established
by a new union constitution adopted in 1953; its strength increased
13during China's first five-year plan, reaching a peak in 1956.
But the unions, along with industry, were decentralized again dur­
ing 1957, as indicated by the revised constitution adopted by the
]kEighth All-China Congress of Trade Unions. The existence of 
overlapping personnel has modified the differences between the re­
gional union organization and the industrial union organization, 
but extensive research on union personnel by Paul Harper suggests 
that significant differences do exist, especially in terms of 
orientation to China's politics-professionalism or red-expert con­
flict. ^ An additional effect of horizontal rather than vertical 
structure is the emphasis on geographical/institutional units 
rather than occupational categories or divisions of labor. That 
is, the emphasis is on the factory as composed of workers, tech­
nicians and cadres and its immediate geographical environment 
rather than on the relationship of workers in different plants 
through the industry-wide union organization.^^ The appropriateness
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of this emphasis within the broader policies of the Great Leap For­
ward and the Maoist strategies of the Cultural Revolution will be­
come more obvious in subsequent chapters.
As the term transmission belt implies, a major function of the 
unions has been two-way communication between the Party and the 
workers. While the Chinese have periodically attempted to improve 
the upward flow of information, this has been difficult in practice 
because of the absence of any real leverage or power at the bottom. 
In this respect the relation between the unions and the Party has 
been similar to relations between lower and higher level cadres 
within the Party. Union officials have been in the middle; they 
are elected by the workers and theoretically represent them, but 
as Party members they are also subject to Party discipline. The 
Party evaluates union cadres and controls all sanctions and re­
wards; therefore, union officials almost Inevitably side with the 
Party when workers' interests conflict with Party directives.
The major source of information about union performance has 
been criticisms of the unions published by the Party or by the 
union leadership. The unions have been criticized for either econ- 
omism or bureaucratism. Economism has meant over-emphasis on worker 
amenities and reliance on material incentives rather than political 
education. Party accusations have associated it with attempts to 
exploit worker demands to put the unions above the Party, and with 
economic trade unionism and syndicalism. Bureaucratism has meant 
preoccupation with production but more with reports, meetings and 
other office chores to the neglect of contact with the workers.
The Chinese Communists have attempted to maintain a balance among 
several relationships. Production Is to be raised by increasing 
worker enthusiasm through political education, but successful edu­
cation depends on worker confidence in the unions and the Party, 
which is in turn contingent on proficient political education but 
also on the way the workers are treated and remunerated, the gen­
eral fulfillment of Party promises, the efficacy of the unions.
n
etc. The key to this balance has been the cadre. Without maximum 
effort by competent and dedicated cadres the balance cannot be ap­
proximated, but competent cadres have been few and their tasks over 
whelming.
At the same time, accusations against lower functionaries may 
also be used to cover mistakes or changes in policy by the Party 
leadership. When mistakes have been made or policies changed, the 
onus has been officially directed either at "counterrevolutionary" 
sabotage or at cadres accused of bureaucratism or economism. The 
cadres involved may be guilty of the mistakes ascribed to them, but 
they may have been following Party policy at the time. The correc­
tive for mistakes has invariably been a combination of increased 
Party control from above and increased mass supervision from below. 
The two sides of this prescription may appear contradictory, but 
they are not. The concept of mass supervision provides the Party 
with a means of enlisting the masses on its side and of criticizing 
union cadres in the name of the mass line. In a similar way, the 
prescribed remedy for mistakes by Party cadres has been increased 
mass initiative together with increased central Party control.
These trends are, of course, not always deal—cut. Economism 
and bureaucratism are not opposite extremes. At times some unions 
have been criticized for economism while others have been under 
attack for bureaucratism or both. Cadres have tended to swing from 
one deviation to another in response to criticism from above.
But the patterns are quite clear. The role assigned to unions 
makes them consistently susceptible to certain types of actual 
mistakes or deviations from Party intentions. It also makes them 
consistently susceptible to playing the role of scapegoat.
Effective performance of the transmission belt function of 
the unions depends on effective political education. In one di­
rection the unions transmit Party policies and directives to the 
workers, together with explanations of the broader political sig­
nificance of those policies within the Party's general line. The
12
workers are also organized to propagate and implement Party pro­
grams for other social groups, like attacks on class enemies.
At the same time, the political consciousness of the workers 
is an "objective condition" that must be considered in the formu­
lation of policy. It is particularly important in assessing the 
feasibility of policies involving major social changes or that 
otherwise depend on participation by the masses. But the Party 
must lead the masses, not follow them, and must constantly raise 
their political consciousness.
This relationship is expressed in the leadership concept of 
the mass line. As an operational concept the mass line depends 
on three assumptions. First, to fulfill their leadership role suc­
cessfully, Party leaders must maintain constant contact with the 
masses. Second, since the Party has superior wisdom and experience 
as the vanguard of the proletariat, the Party alone knows the long­
term, collective interests of the people as a whole. Third, while 
the Party must use persuasion and education rather than coercion
in taking its policies to the masses, it is the Party that must
18lead. Active mass participation is called for, but it consists
of executing rather than formulating or controlling policy. In
Mao's words, "we must teach the masses clearly what we have re-
19ceived from them confusedly."
Political Education and Production
Political education has permeated all functions of Chinese 
trade unions. Production emulation campaigns have been the main 
classroom, but almost all union activities have involved political 
education in one way or another. While the Party played an in­
creasingly important role in political education after the early 
fifties, the unions have consistently provided the organizational 
framework. A major reason for attempting to increase union member­
ship has been that workers outside the union system do not receive 
the systematic education that can be applied through the union
13
apparatus.
Perhaps the most important part of the apparatus, in the unions 
as in China in general, has been the small group. Franz Schurmann 
has argued that a major organizational contrast between the Soviet 
Union and China has been the contrast between individuation and col­
lectivization. In his view, the Soviet system tended toward indi­
vidual atomization suited to control, while the Chinese system has
tended toward small-group atomization, suited to persuasion, indoc-
20trination and activization.
In addition to daily efforts at practical political education,
the unions also conducted courses in the histories of the Party and
the Chinese labor movement, Marxism-Leninism, and the thought of
21Mao Tse-tung as part of a major spare-time education program. The
schedule of one model factory was published in 1953 as an example
for other factories. All workers spent three hours of class time
each week studying the current mass propaganda campaign and two
22hours per week on Marxist-Leninist ideology. It is doubtful, 
however, that this ideal was often attained on a regular basis in 
many factories. With the advent of one-man management and concur­
rent emphasis on labor discipline over political education, prac­
tice increasingly deviated from the model. A move to restore the 
program began in late 1956 and early 1957, only to be Interrupted 
again by the Great Leap Forward. Another attempt to reestablish 
systematic classroom programs during the early sixties was inter­
rupted by the Socialist Education Movement and the Cultural Revolu­
tion during which many hours were devoted to ideological study, but 
the subject matter had changed to Mao's thoughts.
Even more important than the tension between in-class and 
"living" or practical learning, but not unrelated to it, has been 
the tension between the two major themes of political education 
noted above. On the one hand, political education has been de­
signed to communize Chinese workers to an acceptance of the ideol­
ogy or world view of Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Mao
]k
Tse-tung. On the other hand, political education has also been de­
signed to socialize the Chinese workers to an acceptance of the 
Communist regime and its nationalistic and industrialization goals 
and programs.
Theoretically, of course, the two themes are intimately re­
lated, and even in practice they overlap considerably. But during 
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution the potential 
dichotomy between them became evident when the Party's leaders dis­
agreed over the issue of politics versus professionalism. Much of 
the divergence stems from the relationship between political edu­
cation and production. The attempt to industrialize and communize 
simultaneously creates a conflict over the relative priorities of 
those two goals Insofar as they are incompatible. That conflict 
has been evident in differences of opinion within the Party lead­
ership. Labor incentive policy embodies the convergence of polit­
ical education and production mobilization, and therefore also 
provides a concrete example of that conflict.
Like the Soviets, the Chinese have employed an Incentive sys-
23tern in which material and nonmaterial rewards are combined. In 
basic outline the Chinese wage system has copied the Soviet system 
of standard wage grades. Wage standards for each grade are cen­
trally determined, primarily on the criteria of establishing incen­
tives for increased effort and ski 11-attainment, and of total wage 
funds available for distribution. As in the Soviet Union, the 
availability of consumer goods has been an important consideration 
in the total wage bill and the general effectiveness of material 
inventives.
The Chinese system of nonmaterial or contributive incentives 
has also generally followed the Soviet system of individual and 
group competitive emulation campaigns and the awarding of honorific 
titles to individual workers and production groups. The awards 
are often accompanied by a cash bonus and other material advantages. 
For example, workers designated as "model," "advanced," and similar
15
terms receive more liberal insurance benefits than other workers. 
Also, almost all workers chosen for Party membership and/or promo­
tion to cadre status or administrative positions have been either
25model workers or worker activists.
If the Chinese incentive system has copied the Soviet model in 
outline, however, it has differed in detail and in style. Commu­
nist theory posits the superiority of various forms of contributive 
incentives over the "capitalistic" incentive of individual wages. 
Ideally, the communist worker contributes his labor freely to the 
collective and receives from it a stipend adequate to his needs.
In practice, both the Chinese and Soviet leaders have deemed indi­
vidual material incentives necessary. Expressed in theoretical 
terms, these countries are considered to be in a socialist rather 
than communist stage of development, and the "correct" wage policy 
for that stage is remuneration according to labor rather than
26according to need.
The Russian answer to the problem of work incentives under 
conditions of economic scarcity was a combination of material in­
centives, contributive incentives and compulsion. The essential 
features of the Soviet system of material incentives—progressive 
piece wages and very sharp wage differentials—were contrary to 
the egalitarian wage policy favored by many of the union leaders 
purged in 1928-1929 and to the assumptions of Marxist theory about 
the solidarity of the working class under a socialist regime. In 
addition, the Soviet system of contributive incentives was a mod­
ified system at best. It included symbolic rewards and appeals to 
patriotism and other collective values, but the heart of the sys­
tem was Stakhanovism and "socialist competition." Both were based
on competition rather than collectivity, and both were tied to
28monetary incentives. The entire incentive policy, in fact, fo­
cused on "leading groups" of workers, such as the Stakhanovites, 
who were able to benefit from very steep piece-wage differentials 
and who were basically rate-busters. Wage increases received by
16
most workers were more than offset by inflation, so that real wages 
for all Soviet nonagricultural wage-earners declined steadily from 
1928 to about 1950.^^
The Chinese Communists have also recognized the need for remu­
neration on the basis of work done as long as all Chinese workers 
are not Communists. During most periods since 19^9 they have ar­
gued, in fact, that attention to workers' welfare was a prerequisite 
for effective political education. Only twice, during the Great 
Leap Forward and during the Cultural Revolution, have they actually 
rejected material incentives. But throughout the twenty years of 
their regime, they have emphasized much more than the Russians the 
cooperative aspects of emulation and the need to combine emulation 
with political education. They have also used piece wages on a 
much smaller scale than the Soviets and have based their emulation 
programs much more on production groups than on individuals.
These differences from the Soviet model have been consistent, 
but the tensions and changes in emphasis have continued. There 
are obvious advantages to an effective system of non-material la­
bor incentives. Under conditions of limited capital and a limited 
consumer market, it is a valuable supplement to total wage alloca­
tions. It may also provide a degree of labor discipline that can­
not be achieved by wage incentives. It is especially conducive to 
quality control because it does not encourage workers to find 
shortcuts that reduce their own work effort at the expense of co­
workers and the whole production process. Most importantly, an 
incentive policy based on competition for material rewards is of 
course, incompatible with communist education but rather compat­
ible with political education aimed at traditional socialization 
and thus conducive to socialization efforts.
The success of persuasive exhortation and other non-material 
incentives is conditional. It will depend for effectiveness on 
the workers' view of their own position in society. That view 
will be influenced by the degree of technical skill and general
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education of the work force, the ability of the workers to influ­
ence trade union policies, union effectiveness in the society at 
large, and not least, by the level of worker remuneration.
Contributive incentives are therefore likely to be much more 
effective for stimulating marginal productivity than as the basic 
method of creating labor discipline unless a total conversion of 
worker views on work and remuneration can be achieved. In addi­
tion, at some point in the industrialization process labor produc­
tivity becomes primarily a function of industrial technology, mech­
anization and rationalization rather than labor discipline or in­
tensification of labor. In the long run, political education can 
only supplement but not replace technology. This conflict within 
the Chinese incentive policy reflects the broader conflicts over 
Chinese labor and general industrial policy.
Administrative Functions of Chinese Trade Unions
Lenin called Soviet trade unions schools of management and 
schools of administration, ostensibly looking toward a future when 
the workers could manage industrial enterprises and even the state 
itself. This idea was soon abandoned by Stalin, but it has not 
been entirely abandoned in China. More importantly, the Chinese 
have been committed to active worker participation in the factories 
as much for its socialization and political education value as for 
administrative training. They have, for example, periodically 
attempted to establish meaningful roles for factory workers' con­
ferences, under the guidance of both Party and union, even if such 
attempts have been short-lived.
Moreover, the unions have consistently administered industrial 
welfare programs, taking up much of their time and energy, and have 
attempted to engage large numbers of worker activists in these pro­
grams. The unions have also played a peripheral role in programs 
for general and technical education for the workers and have per­
formed other administrative roles at various times. The unions
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have actively participated in a large variety of administrative 
programs and also mobilized the workers for participation. This 
also has served the Party by relieving it of various administrative 
chores. In sum, there has been in China a desire for active worker 
participation in the factories and in the state that contrasts 
sharply with the spirit of control that prevailed in the Soviet 
Union.
A major task in which the unions did not participate was the 
allocation of labor, attended to by Labor Bureaus under the Minis­
try of Labor. In contrast to the unions whose roles and functions 
were primarily internal to the factories, the Labor Bureaus for­
mally mediated labor-management relations above the factory level 
and oversaw various labor regulations, such as those pertaining to 
working conditions. By 1957, however, as industry was socialized 
and the Party became Increasingly committed to complete control
over labor allocation, the Bureaus' primary functions were super-
29vision of unemployment and labor assignment policies.
Chapter 11
THE HONEYMOON PERIOD, 19^9-1952
The main economic goal of the Chinese Communists has been so­
cialist industrialization, that is, industrialization of the Chinese 
economy and socialization of industry, handicrafts, and agriculture.' 
The strategy for industrializing the economy adopted by the Party in 
19^9 and the early fifties was in essence the Soviet program for in­
dustrialization. Before China's first five-year plan could be im­
plemented, however, the country had to be prepared.
The years 19^9 to 1952 were a period of consolidation for the
Chinese Communists. After they had won the civil war in 19^9» they
faced the task of moving from rural guerrilla centers to the cities
and the poiitical consolidation of their victory. In industry, too,
this was a period of consolidation, sometimes aimost of starting
from scratch. China in 19^9 was characterized by severe economic
scarcity and underdevelopment. The economy had in the forties been
ravaged by the Sino-Japanese War, the civil war and the sabotage of
retreating Kuomintang troops. The industrial complex established
by the Japanese in Manchuria had been stripped by occupying Russian 
2soldiers. Communication and transportation systems and many fac­
tories had been destroyed. Inflation was rampant. In terms of 
both industrial base and reservoir of available skills, conditions 
in China were significantly less favorable than conditions In Rus­
sia after the October Revolution.
Labor policy was Influenced by both the flush of victory and 
the major tasks facing the regime. It was in many ways a honey­
moon period for the unions and the workers. The support and pai— 
ticipation of the workers was actively wooed, and many were pro­
moted to cadre and administrative positions. A national labor
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insurance program was introduced and widely publicized. The unions 
were assigned many different functions and allowed a degree of in­
dependence in carrying them out. The specific tasks assigned to 
them reflected this general orientation. To the extent that an in­
tegrated program of interrelated functions was realized, categori­
zation is somewhat artificial. Nevertheless, various union func­
tions are discussed separately for analytic purposes.
The major administrative tasks of the unions during this ini­
tial period were building the unions and recruiting cadres, assist­
ing the Party to recruit workers for cadre and administrative line- 
staff positions, representing the workers in the factories, and 
introducing labor insurance and related welfare programs.
Building the Unions and Recruiting Cadres
In the early years of the Communist regime the unions played 
a prominent role, in collaboration with the Party, in building 
their own organization and in recruiting workers for promotion.
The organization and reorientation of the union structure and 
the recruitment of union members was, logically and chronologically, 
the first task of the unions. Union cadres were sent to establish 
unions where none existed. In enterprises with established unions, 
teams of cadres were sent in to break the power of gang-labor
3chiefs and to reorganize the unions. The process of screening 
workers during this period was, in fact, overly rigorous in many 
areas. According to Hsii Chih-chen, many cadres committed the 
error of "closed doorism," excluding workers on the bases of ide-
It
ological leanings, work ability, and educational level. As Hsli 
argued, a major function of the unions was to educate the workers 
to overcome those very disabilities. At the same time, an attempt 
w?s made to screen intransigent trouble-makers and "counterrevolu­
tionaries" from union membership and especially from positions of 
authority.
As in the Soviet Union, membership in unions was not compulsory.
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but every effort was made to persuade workers to join. In addition 
to the personal efforts of union and Party cadres, the press de­
voted considerable space to publicizing increases in union member­
ship and the advantages of membership. The administration of labor 
insurance was also coordinated with this effort. According to the 
ACFTU, workers in "key" Industries and cities were "basically or­
ganized" by the end of 1950.^ By the end of 1952 ninety percent of 
all industrial workers had joined unions.^ Recruitment became an 
issue again only in 1958 when the number of workers suddenly in­
creased from nine million to more than twenty-five million as a 
result of the policies of the Great Leap Forward. Even then the 
recruitment problem was not major. Many of the new workers were 
only part-time and thus ineligible for union membership. Also dur­
ing that period much of the mobilization of the workers was carried 
out by the Party committees directly, obviating mobilization by the 
unions.
In 19^9 the unions were also assigned the task of assisting the 
Party branches select and nominate workers for cadre posts and as­
sisting In the promotion of competent workers to administrative 
positions. In most cases these workers were first or simultaneously 
recruited into the Party. After these early years the unions were 
not mentioned in connection with this task at all, and industrial 
enterprises came to be staffed more and more by Party members who 
were sent to technical schools on the Party's initiative. But dur­
ing this early period the assistance of all official and semi­
official organizations was necessary. And the unions did continue 
to provide practical administrative experience and areas for activ­
ism through which individual workers could distinguish themselves 
for promotion.^
Representing the Workers
According to Articles Five and Six of the Trade Union Law of 
the People's Republic of China:
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Trade unions in enterprises operated by the 
state or by co-operatives shall have the right 
to represent the workers and staff members in 
taking part in administering production and in 
concluding collective agreements with the man­
agements.
Trade unions in private enterprises shall have 
the right to represent the workers and staff 
members in conducting negotiations and talks 
with the owners of these private enterprises, 
in taking part in the labour-capital consulta­
tive councils and in concluding collective 
agreements with the owners of these private en- 
terprises.®
As one would expect, however, not only did the nature of this func­
tion depend on whether an enterprise was state or privately owned, 
it was also particularly susceptible to fluctuations in Party pol­
icy in both types of enterprise.
Before the general nationalization of industry in the mid­
fifties, the state assumed ownership of those enterprises previously 
owned by the Kuomintang government or by bureaucratic capitalists.
A transitional system of factory management was established in state- 
owned enterprises. Since control and communications networks of the 
central authorities had not yet been consolidated, practice did not 
always conform to stated policy, and geographical diversity existed. 
But the general pattern was as follows. In most ai:;eas enterprises 
were actually taken over by the army's Military Control Commissions. 
The enterprises were then administered by Factory Administrative 
Committees consisting initially of top managerial and engineering 
personnel, local Party cadres, and military commanders. In effect, 
because the military and Party personnel lacked technical and ad­
ministrative competence, the managers retained operational direction
of the enterprise while the military and Party personnel held ulti- 
9mate veto power.
Official policy called for a change in state-owned enterprises 
to a system of collective or democratic management as soon as pos­
sible. What this meant in practice was that the Party committees 
came increasingly to dominate factory affairs. But the unions also
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played a significant role. It was their duty to educate the work­
ers preparatory to participating in democratic management, and they
were to organize Staff and Workers Representative Councils which
»
elected representatives to the Factory Administrative Committees. 
Many of the tasks of the Facotry Committees were, in fact, handled 
by standing committees consisting of the factory manager, the head 
of the union, and a third member who was "co-opted by the Factory 
Administrative Committee."^^
In private industries worker-management relations were to be 
systematized by the establishment of laboi—capital consultative 
councils. The unions appointed worker representatives to the coun­
cils, and the union chairman was an ex-officio member of the coun­
cil along with the owner or his representative and the manager. 
Labor-management relations centered on the adoption of factory col­
lective agreements and the settlement of grievances, but these two 
issues were important in form only.
Collective agreements in China have followed the pattern es­
tablished in Soviet industrial relations. The primary function of 
the agreements has been to publicize the factory production plan 
established by the state. In China the agreements have also had a 
second purpose, to establish management's responsibilities to the 
staff and workers that included the hiring and firing of workers, 
certain issues related to wages such as overtime pay and bonuses, 
treatment of apprentices, and equality of wages for men and women, 
the establishment of working hours and holidays, protection of fe­
male and child labor, and welfare benefits pertaining to workers 
in enterprises with less than one hundred employees and thus not 
participating in the national labor insurance program. Policies 
on these issues differed slightly from one type of enterprise to 
another, but they were basically defined by national labor legis­
lation.
The unions were also formally designated to represent the 
workers in consultation with management to settle grievances.'^
2k
In practice, however, the Chinese have favored informal mediation 
and persuasion over formal mediation and arbitration procedures, 
and formal grievance procedures are almost never mentioned in the 
Chinese labor press.
The formal worker and union role in the state-owned factories 
was therefore much greater than in private factories, with equal 
representation on the Factory Administrative Committees and their 
own Representative Councils to provide mass supervision of manage­
ment, "tap the wisdom of the workers," and give the workers a sense 
of active participation in the enterprise. On the other hand, 
workers and unions were expected to cooperate more consistently 
with state managers than with private managers. In sum, this was 
a period of relatively active participation by workers and unions.
Welfare Tasks
Workers' welfare more than any other activity has been the 
special concern of the unions in China. Primarily, they have had 
total responsibility for the administration of labor insurance.'^ 
They have also been responsible for general assistance to the work­
ers (for example, mediating marriage disputes, helping workers bud­
get their incomes, and organizing mutual aid societies), for organ­
izing and administering cultural and recreational facilities, and 
for certain tasks related to labor protection or factory conditions.
The performance of all these tasks has reflected, once again, 
fluctuations in general economic policy. During the early years 
labor insurance was in the limelight. In February of 1951, labor 
insurance regulations were issued by the Chinese government.'^
Under these regulations, in plants with more than 100 workers the 
management was to provide insurance benefits for retired, injured, 
and child-bearing workers. In smaller plants, workers and manage­
ment were to reach agreements negotiated by the unions. In enter­
prises regularly covered by the national insurance program the 
unions managed insurance funds and carried out all duties connected 
with the collection and distribution of insurance funds.
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The unions were also made responsible for establishing "com­
munal labor insurance establishments," i.e., sanatoria, rest homes 
for the aged, orphanages, and homes for the disabled. Both the 
ACFTU and local unions sponsored such establishments. In major in­
dustrial centers, union councils also opened schools to train labor 
insurance officials. According to official statistics, 200,000 
cadres had been so trained by 195^.^^
During the early fifties the administration of labor insurance 
reflected other current policies. The unions were attempting to 
encourage voluntary membership by all eligible employees by point­
ing out that union members received superior insurance benefits.
The unions' major focus of attention was the organization of emula­
tion campaigns for production in which they recommended model work­
ers for special benefits. The regime was also trying to liberate 
women and bring them into the work force by making insurance pro­
visions for women workers during childbearing.
In the field of cultural and recreational facilities, the 
unions were to establish clubs, cultural halls or palaces, librar­
ies, and cultural and recreational programs. One of the major 
reasons for these programs initially was presumably to occupy the 
workers' spare time and thus control such activities as gambling 
and drinking. But it was also designed to serve the positive func­
tion of conducting both cultural and political education among the 
workers. By the end of 1955 all factories with more than 100 work­
ers reportedly had their own recreational clubs.Aside from this 
figure, however, very little was published about the activities 
themselves during the early fifties. Before they were significantly 
developed, they were preempted by production efforts with the be­
ginning of China's first five-year plan, and cultural education
] 8became temporariiy the responsibility of management.
Political Education
Political education is discussed in some detail in the pre­
vious chapter. During this early period the effort to socialize
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the workers predominated. The workers were lauded as the leading 
class in the state, and improvements in the lives of the workers 
since "liberation" were emphasized along with the role of the Party 
in providing those improvements. Another major theme of political 
education during this period was the patriotic "Resist-U.S., Aid- 
Korea" campaign. China now belonged to the workers, under Party 
leadership. Conditions were already better than before "libera­
tion," as evidenced, for example, by the new national labor insur­
ance program. But the major tasks of industrialization lay ahead, 
and the country was threatened from without. Therefore the workers 
must also realize their responsibilities as the leading class and 
sacrifice immediate and partial interests for the overall and long­
term interests of the state as spelled out in Party programs and 
policies.
The attempt to coordinate these lessons is illustrated by the 
nature of union participation in the "Anti-U.S." movement. In Octo­
ber of 1950, a patriotic emulation or production-mobilization cam­
paign was initiated in the Northeast and soon became nationwide.
The thesis connecting the emulation campaign to a broader propaganda 
movement was that a truly prosperous China could only be built after 
the defeat of American imperialism in Asia, particularly in Korea at
that time, and that the United States could only be defeated in
19Korea by increased production within China. In addition to the 
production campaign, the unions were also to organize the workers 
for related educational programs, demonstrations against the United 
States, and patriotic donations to the war effort.
Product ion
In China, as in other developing countries, production has 
been a central function of the unions. It has been at the center 
of a relatively unified union policy in which specific tasks re­
lating to production, incentives, welfare, and political education 
are all closely related. The emphasis in approach to stimulating 
production during a given time period has reflected Party policy
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emphases. Labor emulation campaigns or socialist emulation cam­
paigns have been the cornerstone of Chinese industrial incentive 
policy. The goal has been continuous participation in some form of 
emulation by the entire work force. Even by early 1951 an estimated 
2.23 million workers had participated in emulation campaigns.By 
the end of 1953 more than 223,000 people had been designated model
u 21 
workers.
China's early campaigns were similar in many ways to Soviet 
Stakhanovite emulations. Shock workers or shock brigades, for ex­
ample, would establish new production records by the "improvement 
ot tools" and the "improvement of work organization," the latter 
being basically the division of work processes into essential and 
auxiliary tasks to allow the shock worker to concentrate entirely 
on the production record, while another worker performed the aux­
iliary tasks. Since it is often more efficient for the worker to 
perform his own auxiliary tasks, this approach is appropriate only 
under conditions of surplus labor and/or for rate busting to estab­
lish new records for other workers to emulate.
But early Chinese emulation campaigns differed from Soviet 
Stakhanovite campaigns in two ways. First, they emphasized work­
group performance rather than individual performance. They tended, 
therefore, to integrate rather than divide production units. A 
major part of the publicity connected with the "new records" cam­
paign, for example, was devoted to the Ma Heng-chang shock brigade. 
The second difference was the emphasis on combining emulation with 
national mass propaganda campaigns such as the "Anti-U.S." movement.
Transmission Belt
The transmission belt function of the unions is discussed in 
this study essentially in terms of Party criticism of union per­
formance. This has both advantages and disadvantages. The manner 
in which the unions serve as a link between the Party and the workers 
provides an overview of how well they are carrying out other duties, 
how well they are communicating with the workers, and how their
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orientation to their own work differs from Party expectations. It 
also means that our perspective will be primarily from the top down 
rather than from the point of view of the workers or even the unions. 
It also means that the emphasis will be on crises and periods of 
major reorientations in union-Party relations rather than day-to- 
day functioning.
The first crisis in Party-union relations came in the early
years of the regime and was widely publicized at the Seventh ACFTU
Congress in 1953. This attack was directed at the national union
leadership which was accused of economism and of seeking independ-
ence from Party control. The unions had "arbitrarily" stressed
the individual interests of the workers as against the overall
long-term interests of the state, and the national leadership had
led lower union organs away from the Party and had considered the
2kunions the "highest form of organization of the working class."
Party priorities and expectations were much different in 1953 
than in 1951 when these deviations had taken place. The Seventh 
ACFTU Congress was held to redirect union activities in preparation 
for significant changes in economic policy. Party accusations were, 
therefore, undoubtedly overstated. Union activities, however, had 
inclined toward independence and economism in 1951 for several 
causes.
One cause of union independence during 1951 was circumstantial. 
In theory, the unions were from the outset under the leadership of 
the Party, but in 1951 the Party was still consolidating its own 
position. Potential rivals were being eliminated, and the Party 
was recruiting the cadres necessary to rule the country. This 
situation had several consequences for the unions. First, the 
workers and unions could be used to attack the capitalists. Second, 
worker support was being actively wooed, as evidenced by the strong 
emphasis on labor insurance and the lack of emphasis on labor dis­
cipline during this period. That is, Party policy itself tended 
to economism during this honeymoon period. The success of the
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revolution combined with Party propaganda about the leadership role 
of the workers must have created very high expectations among the 
Chinese workers. And, third, the Party did not seem to exercise 
very direct control over union affairs during this period. The 
Party issued policies, but they were carried out by the unions in 
a relatively independent way.
Paul Harper has suggested an additional point in this connec­
tion. The functionaries of the old Chinese Association of Labor 
(cal) had been absorbed into local unions after CAL was dissolved. 
Most of these men were non-Communists and had been exposed to the 
union philosophy of the West. Many of them, therefore, may have 
been more committed to economic or trade unionist struggle than to 
political struggle. The relevance of this point would seem to 
be modified by the fact, not overlooked by Harper, that Party criti­
cism during this period was directed almost entirely at the national 
leadership and not at local units. At the same time, out of the ten 
representatives from the CAL included in the top ACFL leadership 
after the Sixth ACFL Congress in 19^8, five were replaced or dropped 
at the Sixth Executive Committee of the ACFL during 1950-195i.^^
A second cause of union economism during this period apparentiy 
was a reaction to earlier criticisms by the Party. The initial task 
in the factories in early 1950 had been to restore production. In 
line with this the linions had worked closely with management. As a 
consequence, by the middle of 1950 the unions were criticized for
27over-emphasizing production and becoming divorced from the workers.
A third major cause of union mistakes was presumably a differ­
ence of opinion between top union leaders and top Party leaders. 
According to the Trade Union Law of 1950: "The trade unions have
their own nationwide, independent and unified system of organize- 
28tion." This statement was missing from the Revised Trade Union 
Law of 1953. The ACFL, expanding and consolidating its control 
over a revamped union structure, also attempted to exert its statu­
tory independence, which invoked a strong reaction from the Party.
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These union deviations during 1951 were attributed mainly to 
Li Li-san. Li, as Minister of Labor and a Vice President of the 
ACFL, had been the official spokesman on labor and union policy in 
China since I9A8. At the Seventh Congress he made no statement and 
was not elected to the new Secretariat of the ACFL (renamed the All- 
China Federation of Trade Unions, ACFTU, at that Congress). Al­
though he retained his position as Minister of Labor for two more 
years, his last major policy speech was delivered in February of 
1951.^^ At the Eighth National Party Congress in 1956 Li offered 
a vague apology for "mistakes I made when I was working at the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions," without specifying the nature
30of those mistakes. The official version of Li's mistakes and
those of other ACFL leaders was that they
formulated a series of mistaken views, namely: 
the administration side should represent the 
whole and long-term interests, while the trade 
union side should represent individual and im­
mediate interests; the administration side 
should represent production, while the trade 
union side should represent distribution, etc.’’
The points emphasized here were obviously that the unions were not 
to be independent of the Party and that union goals were not dif­
ferent from Party goals. Production, not worker remuneration, was 
the unions' primary consideration. The workers, through the unions, 
were to be used by the Party against the capitalists. But their 
conflict with management was as a part of "the people" and not as 
workers or union members. They were to confront enterprise owners 
on such issues as obeying state laws and cooperating in state 
plans, not on the issue of wages.
The union sins of economism and excess independence were as­
cribed to the central organs of the ACFL. The second attack on 
the unions was directed at lower-level cadres and concerned mistakes 
of quite a different nature. By 1952 and 1953 the unions were 
caught up in the policy changes introduced by the san-fan and wu-fan
32movements and prepatory to China's first five-year plan. The 
unions were assigned a major role in the attack on capitalists
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during that campaign. This, of course, changed the task orienta­
tion of the unions in private enterprises.
But the unions also came under attack and were reorganized 
during the san-fan movement. For the unions those campaigns began 
with a Democratic Reform Movement which was launched in the North­
east in 1951. It was essentially a movement to purify factory-
level unions of "bad elements" who persisted in old pa tao practices
33of taking bribes for obtaining jobs for people. The san-fan cam­
paign, as it applied to the unions, was an intensification of that 
purification process.
Union cadres were accused of the three general sins of extrav­
agance, waste, and bureaucratic work style from which the movement 
received Its name. They were also accused of inadequately super­
vising managers and thus of allowing irregularities to occur, of 
failing to promote workers, of bowing to the technical expertise 
of retained administrators, and of neglecting the political educa- 
tion of the workers. Some union cadres had allowed themselves 
to be bribed or corrupted by the owners and managers. In the most 
serious cases they were accused of gross corruption in their own 
union work.^^ Lai Jo-yu, the new ACFTU president, and other mem­
bers of the national union leadership formally confessed to the
36lesser charges of extravagance, waste, and bureaucratism. Lower- 
level cadres were subjected to criticism and, in the more serious 
cases, purged from leadership positions in the unions.
The attacks on the unions at this time were preparatory to 
policy changes, but they were also intended to "purify" the unions. 
Most of the union cadres purged during the Democratic Reform Move­
ment and the san-fan movement were from one of two groups: old
union officials who had stayed at their posts after 19^9 without 
sufficiently reforming, and cadres from the old Communist guerrilla 
areas who were "corrupted" by the move to the cities and their 
new positions of authority. Replacements for purged cadres were 
recruited primarily from worker activists who proved their merit
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during the san-fan and wu-fan campaigns.
The wu-fan campaign also involved mobilization of the workers.
They were organized by the unions to voice grievances and to hold
37"confrontation meetings" with employers. This served to pressure 
employers toward the regime's goals and also served to mobilize the 
workers who, especially in old industrial cities like Shanghai, had 
remained closely tied to their employers.
Chapter 111
CHINA'S FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND THE SOVIET 
MODEL, 1953-1955
By the end of 1952 the major preliminary tasks of the regime
had been accomplished. Social order had been established, and
China's industrial base had been rehabilitated. The inflationary
spiral had been broken as early as March of 1950, and control over
the country's fiscal system established in 1951. The influence of
remaining class enemies had been largely eliminated. In 1953
China's first five-year plan began and with it China's attempt at
implementing the Soviet model of industrial development.^ The
major characteristics of that model were centralized planning of
the economy, including the establishment of production and growth
targets for industry, agriculture and other economic branches, the
priority of industrial investment over consumption, the priority of
investment in heavy over light industry, and organization and con-
2trol of the economy by large ministerial bureaucracies.
At the same time a major effort was made to introduce the 
Soviet system of one-man management in Chinese factories. Even be­
fore that time the system was in operation in factories where Soviet 
influence was prominent, especially the joint Sino-Soviet factories 
at Dairen and the heavy industrial factories of Manchuria. Its 
basic feature was vertical command, from a single plant manager to 
shop supervisor to section chief to production team heads. Mana­
gers received directives from, and were directly responsible to, 
the central ministries. Their jurisdiction within the factory was, 
in theory, all inclusive. The role of the Party committee was 
therefore reduced to ideological guidance of the manager, and un­
ion-worker participation in management atrophied. In a later 
criticism of this development concerning worker participation.
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Li Hsueh-feng addressed the Eighth Party Congress as follows:
Conferences and delegate conferences of work­
ers and staff members which in themselves are 
one of the best ways to promote democracy in 
the enterprises are often turned into meetings 
at which the leadership assigns tasks and the 
masses give their pledges. The mass of the 
workers and staff members describe such meet­
ings as occasions when "the director makes a 
report, the Party committee gives instructions, 
the trade union issues a call, and the masses 
give their pledges."^
Formal union functions remained relatively unchanged from the 
previous period, but introduction of the Soviet model profoundly 
changed actual union tasks. The pattern of union performance dur­
ing this period definitely emphasized production and labor disci­
pline, to the neglect of welfare and political education.
The san-fan and wu-fan movements and an "anti-bureaucratism" 
campaign which followed it in 1953 were the first steps in China's 
transition from an initial period of economic rebuilding and po­
litical consolidation to a period of rapid industrialization and 
"transition to socialism." An initial problem was to restore pro­
duction, especially in private industry, since those movements 
had paralyzed local initiative. The unions were also being struc 
turally reorganized in preparation for an intensified industriali­
zation drive. The unions were to concentrate all their attention 
on production and political education. They were to "avoid unim­
portant duties that have little to do with production or the 
masses," avoid encouraging workers into spare-time activities, and 
abolish unnecessary committees and reduce administrative overhead. 
According to Lai Jo-yu, at the Seventh Trade Union Congress, "the 
most important task of the trade unions is to unite and lead all 
workers, technical personnel and other employees so that they may 
consciously and actively develop production."^
Management was not responsible for production planning and 
enterprise administration. The Party committee, assisted by the 
unions and the Communist Youth League, was responsible for
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mobilizing the workers for production.^ Direct Party control of 
union activities increased significantly as the Party committees 
were freed from managerial responsibilities. Union functions were 
oriented away from the rather broad diversity of the previous four 
years to concentrate on mobilizing workers for production.
Production, Political Education and Welfare
Emulation campaigns continued to be praised as the primary 
method for increasing production. But the new orientation brought 
with it an emphasis on labor discipline and individual responsi­
bility that was absent during the early years of the regime. Not 
only was the honeymoon over, but the system of one-man management 
Itself was designed to function on the basis of factory discipline 
rather than the production-floor spontaneity of political mobiliza­
tion by union and Party cadres.
The problem of labor discipline was indeed a serious one. By 
the end of 1953 the number of Industrial workers had more than
odoubled since 19^9» from 3,00^,000 to 6,188,000. A major campaign 
to increase labor discipline was conducted In two surges, in the 
summer of 1953 and the summer of 195^, in an effort to reduce ab­
senteeism among new workers still closely tied to rural families. 
They also came at a time of year when heat and ventilation prob­
lems exacerbated unfavorable working conditions. The Party's an­
swer to the universal problems of labor discipline in an underde­
veloping country, such as the immature and rural nature of the 
work force, and factory working conditions, had been political 
education toward workers self-discipline. That solution had been
inadequate, and leadership cadres charged with politically educat-
9ing the workers were severely criticized.
In an effort to strengthen labor discipline, the Party took 
the first steps. But most of the actual work was assigned to the 
unions, under Party leadership. The suggested methods for improving 
the situation were to increase and improve political education, 
assist management to improve factory conditions, and increase
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management control within factories. In fact, improvements in 
factory conditions were slow to appear, and even political educa­
tion was often replaced by management control and punishment. 
According to early pronouncements, continued emphasis on educa­
tional persuasion was not meant to rule out punitive action when 
warranted.^^ Within a short time the "erroneous adoption" of "rash 
methods of punishment" in place of education was being criticized,
12but punitive measures "when necessary" continued to be sanctioned.
in the summer of 195^ new labor regulations, similar to those
in the Soviet Union, were promulgated, stipulating penalties for
13absenteeism, tardiness and violations of factory regulations.
According to later criticism, management took advantage of the labor
discipline campaign to adopt harsh punitive methods and to shift
1Aresponsibility for accidents onto the workers. The unions them­
selves had to be warned against punitivism in their own work and 
to oppose punitivism by management.
To assist in the enforcement of labor discipline, workers' 
courts were established In major industries. These courts were 
set up and directed by the People's Courts, guided by the unions, 
and staffed by workers and employees. Modeled on the Soviet com­
radely courts, these organizations were established to settle 
minor discipline cases directed to them by management.
In production work, increased sophistication and profession­
alism accompanied the Soviet model. Improvements in technique and 
quality control were added to shock tactics in the emulation cam­
paigns.^^ The propaganda efforts accompanying the campaigns empha­
sized the need for labor discipline and personal austerity rather 
than patriotism and working class superiority. Political education 
was largely replaced by labor discipline, and the hours actually 
devoted to political study decreased sharply.
Workers' welfare was also neglected. Average wages increased 
much more slowly than previously and fell far behind increases in 
labor productivity.^^ Labor insurance coverage was increased
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significantly by revisions in the regulations in January of 1953,'^
18but even then labor insurance coverage remained relatively small.
In 195^ and 1955 increases in labor insurance coverage barely kept 
pace with increases in the number of workers and employees even 
though universal coverage had not been approximated.
It is almost impossible to draw precise conclusions from the 
incomplete and confusing data available on communal labor insur­
ance facilities, except to say that they have consistently been
inadequate to serve China's work force and have been limited al-
19most entirely to large factories engaged in heavy industry.
Little was also done to protect the workers' safety or to enforce 
good working conditions, and union responsibility was secondary to 
that of the Ministry of Labor and its branch bureaus. The unions 
were assigned the task of assisting and supervising management and 
mobilizing the workers to do likewise on a day-to-day basis. How­
ever, the ACFTU did not convene Its first national conference on 
labor protection until 1955. At that time basic-level unions were
instructed to set up labor protection working committees, indlcat-
20ing that this had not been done previously.
Party-Union Relations
In the midst of these changes, the unions were once again
criticized for bureaucratism and divorce from the masses in late
195^ and 1955. In many unions, it was charged, all decisions were
made by one person or a small group, and meetings were not held,
so there was no mass participation or collective leadership in 
21union work. Union cadres considered themselves a "special group"
22and did not rely on activists. Moreover, they failed to show
interest in workers' welfare or to relate political education to
23the workers own lives and problems.
There seem to have been good reasons why the unions continued 
In their bureaucratic ways despite the Party's admonitions in 1953. 
In this case, the charge of bureaucratism denoted a burgeoning pro­
fessionalism within the unions, under the impetus of the strict
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division of responsibility and professionalism of the one-man man­
agement system.
We may also assume that Party leadership also contributed to 
this trend. Direct Party leadership over union work led the unions 
to abdicate responsibility for working with the masses. With its 
mass work largely taken over by the Party committees, the unions 
would be further motivated to concentrate on their own bureaucratic 
work. This was always a temptation because the unions' paper work 
was both prodigious and unavoidable. In addition, while the call 
in 1953 for Party leadership in union work had been implemented, 
the verbal emphasis on political education had not been realized 
in fact. In any case. Party leadership over the unions was very 
strong by the summer of 1955, but the situation was further com­
plicated by the socialization of private industry.
Trade Unions and the Socialization of Industry
Between I9A9 and 1953 the number of private industrial estab­
lishments in China steadily increased, as industrialization was 
encouraged with no corresponding effort to socialize enterprises.
In 195^ that trend was, reversed; in 1955 the number of private en­
terprises decreased sharply; and by the end of 1956 almost all 
enterprises had been converted to joint state-private ownership.
While this change took place primarily in 1956, the unions 
were being prepared for it during the preceding years. The fact 
that the unions had a role to play in the socialization process 
was publicized periodically since late 1953. Before socialization 
the unions were to educate the capitalists to apply to the govern­
ment for joint ownership of their factories and to call meetings 
of workers and office employees "to dispel their fears." After 
joint management was established, the unions helped state manager­
ial personnel familiarize themselves with factory conditions and 
assisted in such routine tasks as stocktaking and "arranging per­
sonnel." The need to "dispel fears" referred to fears that wages
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would decrease In factories being socialized, fears that were ap-
25parently well founded.
As the Party prepared to socialize industry, an attack was
initiated against the unions in private factories to correct two
different types of problems. The first was the corruption of the
unions by capitalists. As an indication of the seriousness of this
problem, the results of investigations in Tientsin and Canton were
publicized in February and March of 1955 indicating that most fac-
26tory-level unions were being co-opted. The second problem, re­
lated to the first, was the failure of unions to supervise manage­
ment to prevent shock tactics and excessive overtime in production
campaigns, leading to an excessive number of industrial accidents,
27and punitivism in the enforcement of labor discipline.
A third criticism of union work lay in the opposite direction 
and was directed at union officials in factories already converted 
to joint ownership. They were charged with opposing management, 
continuing the class struggle, and failing to cooperate in produc­
tion. The change in ownership status changed the nature of labor- 
management relations and demanded a greater emphasis on production.
The socialization of industry brought with it a fundamental 
change in the unions' role in Chinese factories. Before 1953 the 
Party had relied oq mass organizations like the unions to check on 
managers, landlords, and others, and the power of those organiza­
tions had peaked during that period. They had also played a major 
role in the socialization of industry. Once the Party had re­
placed private managers, the unions were no longer expected to 
play quite the same role of opposition to management. This change 
in relationships was the major reason for the debate over the 
proper role of the unions from 1955 to 1957.
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Chapter IV
SOCIALIZATION OF INDUSTRY AND THE ROLE 
OF UNIONS, 1955-1957
In March of 1955 Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih were expelled from 
the Party In a major purge and policy reversal that marked the 
semi-official demise of one-man management in Chinese factories.
At the Eighth National Party Congress in 1956 the new management 
policy of collective leadership by the Party committees, already 
in effect in most factories by that time, was officially adopted. 
Under the new system, the function of technical or operational 
management was separated from policy managenent. The Party com­
mittees were to be responsible for overall policy, formulation of 
enterprise production plans, and negotiations with central minis­
tries and other outside contacts. The managers were to carry out 
the plans established by the Party committees.
The years 1956 and 1957 saw the collectivization of agricul­
ture, completion of the first five-year plan and the socialist 
transformation of industry, a small "big leap forward" in Industry 
and a major wage increase, and the Hundred Flowers campaign. In 
general, the multi-functional or balanced pattern of union per­
formance was reestablished. But it was also a period of intense 
discussion over the proper role of the unions in socialized in­
dustry.
Production, Political Education and Administrative Tasks
Toward the end of 1955 production-oriented union work shifted 
once again away from labor discipline to emulation. A major cam­
paign was initiated late in 1955, for example, to complete the 
first five-year plan ahead of schedule.^ A second emulation move­
ment launched by the unions at this time was called the advanced
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workers campaign. The major tasks of the unions in this campaign 
reflected a renewed emphasis on balancing labor discipline with 
political education: to call workers' congresses to discuss ra­
tionalization proposals, production targets, previous errors, etc.; 
to educate the workers to the advanced experiences of both China 
and the Soviet Union; to organize mutual aid and cooperation; and 
to eliminate conservative thinking within their own ranks.
With the shift in emphasis back to emulation campaigns, and 
especially toward the end of 1956, political education reemerged 
as the prime method to bolster labor discipline. One cause of the 
recurrence of problems in labor discipline was the large influx of 
new workers during 1956. They needed political education to over- 
come their materialism. But the message of political education 
was still not communistic; temporary sacrifice was necessary as an 
investment in future material abundance.
A second problem demanding increased political education was 
that the 1956 wage reform had encouraged an "economic point of 
view" among veteran workers. In addition, emphasis on factory 
democracy and strengthening the workers' conferences had also con­
tributed to a general relaxation in labor discipline and work atti­
tudes.^ Finally, the unions were also expected to politically ed­
ucate ex-capitalists, men who had owned enterprises that were now 
joint- or state-owned. In most cases, these men were retained in 
administrative positions and, having become wage earners, were 
eligible for union membership.
By early 1957 political education emphasized the major themes 
of the early fifties: current events and International affairs,
patriotism, and the Party's current line and leadership role. It 
also included emphasis on the correct worker attitude toward labor 
in the new state enterprises.
Union administrative tasks, other than their own organization 
work, also returned to the forefront, specifically those tasks 
associated with the workers' conferences, welfare, and non-political
education programs.
Workers' conferences were revitalized in 1956. Union commit­
tees were once again charged with convening the conferences and 
supervising the implementation of conference resolutions between 
conference sessions as vi(el 1 as the administrative work connected 
with the conferences. The Party committees were given leadership 
over the conferences themselves and over the general task of regu­
lating relations between workers and management.^ Nevertheless, 
efforts by union leaders to establish a prominent role for workers' 
conferences were a key issue in the Party-union debate that fol­
lowed and are discussed in the next section of this chapter.
Welfare work had been badly neglected during the previous
0years. Because the unions were preoccupied with carrying out pro­
duction-oriented directives from above, they were not primarily a 
workers' organization in outlook. They were too busy to check on 
workers' living conditions or to organize cultural and recreational 
activities. Moreover, the orientation and preferences of individ­
ual union committees had had little relevance because the unions 
had no power to oppose management decisions. A prime example was 
labor protection. Despite criticisms in the press during late 
195^ and 1955, the imposition of extra work hours, resulting in 
high accident rates, continued to be common practice in 1956.^
When union committees opposed this practice, they were accused of 
economism, and their opposition was overruled in the name of ful­
filling production quotas.
In another respect, unions were also relatively helpless to 
improve welfare conditions. Many of the criticisms of workers' 
living conditions during this period involved poor housing and 
deficiencies in insurance and other amenities. The unions had no 
control over the total funds allocated by the central government 
for workers' livelihood and welfare, except to report conditions 
in the!r area.
A wage reform was carried out in early 1956 to standardize
wage policy throughout the country and to increase wages and empha­
size materiai Incentives.^^ Also, iabor insurance was now caicu- 
lated on the basis of wages. ' A major effort was also initiated 
during i956 to aiieviate acute shortages in urban housing. The 
construction of new housing for workers became a publicity item 
almost as widely exploited as labor insurance had been during the 
early fifties. The housing problem in China was, however, severe. 
From 19^9 through 1955, per capita urban living space had decreased 
especially in rapidly growing industrial centers. Major increases 
in new construction in 1956 and 1957 barely arrested the decline 
and were overwhelmed by large-scale migration to urban centers in 
1958 and 1959.’^
Finally, the unions' administrative role in non-political ed­
ucation came into prominence for the first time. Literacy and 
general education classes for industrial workers have been provided 
almost exclusively in China by spare-time industrial schools. Tech
nical education to produce skilled workers has been carried out
1 3mainly through on-the-job apprentice training. ^ Technical educa­
tion to produce administrators from the ranks of the labor force 
has also been through the spare-time schools to some extent, but 
after the early fifties most potential administrators were sent to 
full-time schools beyond union influence. Initially, the unions 
were directly responsible for organizing the spare-time schools 
and for arranging apprentice-master relations in the factories.'^ 
Under the system of one-man management these responsibilities had 
passed to management. After the demise of that system, responsi­
bility became dispersed, with emphasis once again on the unions.
In terms of emphasis and, probably, of long-term effects, the 
spare-time schools have been the most important method of educating 
Chinese workers. Nevertheless, the program has had a mixed his­
tory. Students and teachers have been poorly qualified, and pro­
duction demands and political meetings have left little time for 
study. During the early years of the program literacy classes pre­
dominated. Few plants conducted specialized technical courses
^5
until 1955“1956. Education above the literacy level consisted 
largely of practical demonstrations of basic skills, best handled 
by experienced workers on the production floor. While more atten­
tion was paid to improving and expanding the program in the mid­
fifties, new problems were created by the Great Leap Forward and 
the economic crisis that followed it. Nevertheless, substantial 
success in eliminating illiteracy among workers has had a major 
long term effect on the efficiency and general outlook of China's 
work force.^^
Party-Union Relations
By the end of 1955 Party leadership over the unions had been 
intensified by the union reorganization that accompanied the so­
cialization of industry. Party leadership had become so complete, 
in fact, that the organizational integrity of the unions was 
threatened. In September of 1955 an editorial in the Jenmin Jihpao 
(JMJP) initiated a discussion of union functions and union-Party 
relations that continued through 1957-
The question was, what role do unions have in socialized in­
dustry. In response, a JMJP editorial encouraged Party committees 
to "bring into full play the supervisory role of trade union or­
ganizations over State organs and economic organs." The Party 
should ensure that the unions carry out Party policies, but not 
usurp the unions' "concrete tasks.An article by Liu Tzu-chiu 
went even further. The major problem in union work at that time, 
Liu argued, was "abject reliance" on the Party, manifested in "com­
plete similarity between, and the indiscriminate mingling together
18of, tasks of labor unions and of the Party." Although Party 
leadership over the unions was necessary, the Party and the unions 
had separate functions.
This theme was continued by Lai Jo-y’u at the Eighth Party 
Congress. According to Lai, the unions spent most of their time 
carrying out the policies of the Party and government, and this 
led to divorce from the masses and to bureaucratism. In fact.
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two problems were being discussed. On the one hand, the unions 
were concentrating on carrying out the directives of Party, govern­
ment and economic organs from above and were therefore neglecting 
their relations with the workers. Union cadres had begun to con­
sider themselves part of the administrative establishment and 
issued orders from their offices. Since they were not communicat­
ing with the workers, they could not serve as a communication link 
from bottom to top or carry out genuine political education among 
the workers. The remedy for this was increased leadership over 
the unions by the primary Party committees, political education, 
and prodding union officials to get out of their offices to work 
with the masses.
The other problem was that in some cases Party committees had
"taken everything into their own hands without making use of the
20unions as an organization." If the unions became organizationally 
indistinguishable from the rest of the administrative establishment, 
that also would preclude the unions from effectively carrying out 
their work of implementing Party policies in light of the concrete 
circumstances in their own factories. Unless increased Party lead­
ership over the unions was applied in the proper manner and spirit, 
it could increase the problem rather than solve it.
A similar situation had developed in union relations with en­
terprise directors. In the process of changing enterprises from 
private to joint state-private ownership, various forms of class 
struggle had been intensified. Once the change was made, however, 
the relationship was also to change. The new relationship was to 
be one of cooperation and mutual help to accomplish common goals.
At the same time, the unions retained the function of protecting 
the workers against bureaucratism by management, especially over­
emphasis on production to the neglect of workers' interests.
Workers' interests were to be protected by mass supervision of 
management by the workers' conferences. In the last analysis, 
workers' interests were defined as increased production.
hi
In that context, protecting workers' interests meant super­
vising management to prevent the violation of Party policies and 
state laws, not to maximize immediate worker remuneration. Never­
theless, union leaders were arguing that the unions and the mana­
gers still had different work and different approaches to problems 
and that the unions ought to provide a forum for worker opinions.
In fact, Lai Jo-yu argued that the conferences should provide a 
vehicle for major decentralization in factory management, that is,
direct worker participation in factory decision-making, with the
21unions playing a major role. The workers' conferences, Lai
22argued, should have equal status with management.
This entire discussion on the functions of the unions reached 
a new level in 1957 with the introduction of the Hundred Flowers 
campaign. By September of 1956 it was evident to Party leaders 
that the first Chinese "leap forward" in agriculture was a relative 
failure, due primarily to peasant resistance to collectivization 
but exacerbated by bad weather during that summer. According to 
Mao, opposition to the collectivization program was still strong 
in the winter of 1956-1957.^^ This failure was officially blamed 
on lower-level cadres. In the press and in many reports and 
speeches to the Eighth Party Congress in September of 1956, cadres 
were criticized for commandism, dogmatism, and blind optimism.
A rectification campaign was launched to improve cadre work style. 
In this case, however, the rectification was to include criticism 
by groups outside the Party, distinguishing the Hundred Flowers 
campaign from earlier rectifications.
Mao called for "a hundred flowers to bloom and a hundred
schools of thought to contend" as early as May of 1956, but the
2hHundred Flowers campaign did not actually begin until 1957.
The idea of letting all schools contend appeared in the union 
press as early as May of 1956, for example, but all of the criti­
cism of union work that appeared during 1956 was Issued by the 
national union leadership. In February of 1957 Mao reissued his
invitation in his famous speech on contradictions among the people, 
in the factories union cadres were instructed to mobilize the work- 
ers for a major rectification campaign in five stages. The first 
stage was to be a period of contending and blooming on the mission 
of the unions. Later stages were to focus on the organizational 
structure of the unions, systems and procedure work, personnel, and 
the livelihood and wages of union cadres. The first three stages 
were still being “consolidated" through the end of 1957, and the 
five-stage program was never completed.
The first task of the unions in the campaign was to overcome 
resistance by cadres who did not want to be criticized and by 
workers who feared retaliation after the campaign was over.^^ This 
fact in itself was indicative of the general state of affairs. To 
encourage worker participation in the campaign, a JMJP editorial 
admitted that several labor disturbances, that is, unauthorized 
strikes, had occurred in the recent past. The editorial even ar­
gued that these disturbances had their “good side" because they
28exposed cadre errors.
The most dramatic response to the call for blooming and con­
tending in union work was a report on an 8,000 tour made by 
Li Hsiu-jen, deputy director of the ACFTU General Office.Li's 
report and letters of personal experience by other union cadres 
written in response to the report were published in most of the 
Chinese press. The unions, these critics argued, did fail to sup­
port worker demands and even defended administrators against the 
workers.
But the reason for this was not only the failings of partic­
ular union cadres. The unions were caught between the workers on 
one side and the administration and Party on the other side. As 
Party members, union cadres were subject to Party discipline which 
often conflicted with worker desires. In their relationship to 
management they were given no support by other organs and were 
helpless to oppose unreasonable regulations or demands for extra
working hours. If they did resist such demands, they were accused 
of economism and their opposition was overruled. The lack of mass 
participation in union work and the failure of workers to attend 
meetings was caused not only by the bureaucratic work style of in­
dividual cadres but also by the fact that the workers had lost re­
spect for the unions.
These criticisms were supported by Lai Jo-y'u in an interview 
with the Kungjen Jihpao (KJJP) that appeared on the same day that 
Li's "8,000 n_Tour" appeared in the These reports called
for increased union independence, albeit under Party guidance.
They also echoed the analysis made earlier by Liu Tzu-chiu, namely, 
that over-reliance on the Party, as it was developing after the 
state assumed control of industry, inhibited the transmission belt 
function of the unions in both directions. It would also seem that 
this position had support from within the top Party leadership out­
side the ACFTU. According to Li Hsiu-jen, he had made his 8,000 li 
tour accompanied by a "responsible comrade" from the central govern­
ment to secure support for the unions from the central leadership.
During the Cultural Revolution Liu Shao-ch'i was accused of
being the actual instigator of the trip although he was also
accused, of course, of instigating all other erroneous or super-
31ceded union policies. Liu's remarks at the Eighth Party Congress 
were more guarded but in the same direction as those by Lai Jo-y'u:
"A system of leadership which combines collective leadership with 
personal responsibility, with the Party as the nucleus should be 
set up in all enterprises...al1 day-to-day affairs should be handled 
according to the principle of division of labor and fixed responsi­
bility."^^
The openness of the call for operational independence for 
the unions was no doubt encouraged by the general Hundred Flowers 
policy. Its reversal came with the reversal of that policy. One 
reason for Mao's speech had been to encourage criticism of cadre 
performance. Once the initial reluctance to "blooming and contend­
ing" was overcome, the response far exceeded his intentions.
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attacking the "dictatorial" ieadership of the Party itseif.
When Mao's speech was finaiiy published in June of i957> it 
signaled a reversal of the rectification campaign. Included in 
the June version were six criteria by which "blossoms" could be 
distinguished from "weeds." Cadres guilty of various errors, es­
pecially criticism of the Party's leaders, remained under attack, 
and future criticism was to be limited to individual cadres. An 
anti-rightist campaign was also initiated against those who had 
abused the Party's invitation to criticize and had "attempted to 
undermine" its leadership role.
In the unions the anti-rightist campaign began with public 
refutation of some of the criticisms expressed during the Hundred 
Flowers period. Beginning in June, workers in some areas were or­
ganized to "detect rightist weeds" and to refute the claims of
"rightist" intellectuals that welfare and working conditions in
3 3Chinese factories were not improving. In October and November 
a series of articles in the KJJP indicated that the policy reversal 
had been accomplished. Many of the welfare demands previously 
submitted by workers were characterized as unreasonable, and criti­
cism that the unions "breathed through the same nose" with adminis­
trators and did nothing to help the workers was now considered to 
be incorrect or erroneously one-sided. Suggestions that the unions 
be abolished or limited to the administration of welfare programs 
were also rejected.
The unions definitely had a function, these articles argued, 
and should not be abolished. They were a link between the Party 
and the workers and did most of the concrete organizational work 
related to welfare, education and production. Union work could 
not be limited to welfare work because welfare, political education, 
and production were ail related. Unions should be active in ail 
three fields, "taking production as the center." The earlier pol­
icy of recognizing the good side of labor disturbances was also 
reversed, and union leaders accused of encouraging disturbances
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were expelled from the Party and relieved of their union positions
35during September and October.
In late November an article by Lai Jo-y"u acknowledged the new
oC
line, at least by implication.'^ This article continued to recog­
nize that the administration and the unions had differences of view 
and that the union position was a difficult one. For the solution 
of these problems, however, Lai merely rejected the old stand-bys 
of increased discussion with the masses and increased reliance on 
Party leadership.
One of the main indicators of the reversal was a subtle but 
significant change in Lai's emphasis. During 1956 and early 1957 
Lai had argued that the Party must exercise political leadership 
over the unions, but that the unions must retain their independent 
organizational role and the Party must not usurp the unions' con­
crete tasks. In mid-1957 Lai began to argue that the unions must 
not disappear and must have tasks separate from the Party's but
not ideological independence from the Party: "The Party platform
37is the trade union platform."
In May of 1958 Lai Jo-y"u died, and he was succeeded as Presi­
dent (now Chairman) of the ACFTU by Liu Ning-yi at the second meet­
ing of the Eighth ACFTU Executive Committee in August of 1958. 
Proceeding that meeting, a rectification conference was held "under
the direct leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist 
38Party." This conference acted to purge three close associates
of Lai from the top echelons of the ACFTU: Tung Hsin, a member of
the ACFTU Secretariat, Wang Jung of the ACFTU Presidium, and Ch'en
39Yung-wen, editor-in-chief of the KJJP. While Lai himself was not 
posthumously attacked in public, he was attacked in an unpublished 
report by Liu Ning-yi for opposing the Party and for buiiding a 
rightist faction within the ACFTU.
The attack on Ch'en Yung-wen was the most detailed of those 
40published. His major crime was writing an article called "Notes 
on a Trip to the West," appearing in the KJJP over several days
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during 1957. In that article he had advocated the organizational 
independence of the unions and union opposition to Party one-sided- 
ness. His trip to the West was in fact to Yugoslavia, and the 
views expressed in his article gave de facto support to the idea 
of strong workers' conferences. He was also accused of encouraging 
a discussion in 1957 in the KJJP on the "crisis of trade unions."
In 1955 he had counteracted a JMJP editorial entitled "Any Accident 
Must be Seriously Examined and Handled" with an editorial in the 
KJJP titled "Oppose the Trend of Punitivism" (see Chapter IN, note 
14). As early as 1951 he had been one of those found guilty of 
economism. In addition, he had consistently refused to publish 
Party propaganda and had collected stories about "cases of injury 
and death [of workers]," and the "discharge of workers," that is, 
careless or arbitrary acts by factory management.
This purge at the top was preceded by purges of union leaders 
at the provincial level for their part in labor disruptions during 
the summer of 1957. Leading union officials in Hopei and Liaoning, 
in particular, were accused of attacking Party leadership over the 
unions and of demanding union independence and of stirring up worker
ill
unrest on the basis of welfare issues. Under the "guise" of 
"protecting workers' interests," they had "fooled" and "corroded" 
the workers into attacking the Party and Party leadership over the 
unions.
Despite a number of revelations during the Cultural Revolution,
it is exceedingly difficult to get a clear picture of exactly what
ii2
went on in China during this period. Much of the detail and 
nuance is simply not available. The information made available 
during the Cultural Revolution is systematically distorted to dis­
credit the losers, and official Communist jargon further obscures 
detailed understanding. It is tempting to see the issue in terms 
of a sympathetic union organization battling for the workers 
against managers and Party administrators. But that, I think, 
would be a mistake and not just an oversimplification, even though 
the issue of union independence did involve the issue of reliance
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on material incentives, which many workers presumably favored.
Union activity was only one area affected by broader issues.
One of those issues was the bureaucratism and command ism of 
lower-level cadres. To achieve the political goal of communiza- 
tion the cadres had to orient their work with the masses toward 
conversion in general and persuasion and education in particular 
cases. To achieve the economic goal of industrialization they had 
to get the job done, thus the temptation to issue orders and coerce
the masses into following them, the very essence of bureaucratism
and commandism. As early as 1956 Mao was making a major effort to 
resolve this conflict by accelerating the pace. The "leap forward" 
in agriculture in 1956, including accelerated collectivization, was 
intended not only to remove economic bottlenecks but also to pro­
vide a practical educational experience that would overcome mass 
resistance to changes in world outlook and orientation. Success 
on that front would also result in accelerated economic advance, 
based on the new attitudes of the masses. At the same time, con­
stant political education of the cadres was also necessary.
It is now clear that Mao faced opposition among the top
leaders of the Party over his entire approach to industrialization
and socialization. In this context, the discussion of the role of 
the unions becomes more understandable. Before the socialization 
of industry there existed some doctrinal justification for distinc­
tions among the Party view, the management view and the union/ 
worker view within factories. After socialization there was a 
tendency for these distinctions to disappear, replaced by a single 
view embodied in the Party. The argument for union independence 
from the Party was that even in socialized industry there would be 
conflicts, or what Mao was to call nonantagonistic contradictions, 
and that the unions therefore had a distinct role to play.
But the question of union independence related directly to 
the disagreement over the direction of major policy. The unions 
had become increasingly professionalized, increasingly a part of
I
an entrenched administrative elite. An independent union organiza­
tion would be free from the "politicizing” influence of lower-level 
Party committees and would become an administrative bureaucracy. 
Therefore, union independence had to be defined very carefully.
The issue was resolved for the unions by decisions at a higher 
and broader level. By the time of the union purge in 1958, the 
Maoist policy of the Great Leap Forward had already been adopted 
and partially implemented. The basis of the Great Leap Forward 
strategy in the factories was an emphasis on political mobilization 
as against the strategy of reliance on material incentives, in­
creased welfare benefits, and technical expertise. While theoret­
ically one task of the unions was political education and mobili­
zation of the workers, this was an activity in which the Party 
itself had always taken the lead and for which the Party genera­
lists were better suited than the relatively professionalized and 
specialized union cadres. Thus, one tactical component of a Great 
Leap strategy would be increased Party leadership over the unions, 
not increased union independence.
Lai Jo-y‘u and some of his close associates had attempted to 
maintain union independence from the Party and were caught in the 
rapid policy changes in 1957 and 1958. Lai's successor, Liu 
Ning-yi, did not suffer the same fate. The issue was further com­
plicated by a long-standing competition between Lai Jo-yu and Liu 
Ning-yi for leadership of the ACFTU. The first president of the 
ACFTU after 19^9 was Ch'en Yun. But Ch'en was one of the inner 
core of Party leaders with other important posts, and his leader­
ship of the unions was mainly titular. When he relinquished that 
title in 1953, his logical successor was Liu Ning-yi, a veteran 
union organizer who was also close to the top Party leadership.
Li Li-san had been the main spokesman on labor policy beginning 
in I9A8-I9A9 but had also been the major victim of the union purge 
in 1951. In fact, Liu Ning-yi had replaced Li as major spokesman 
for the unions after 1951. However, Lai Jo-yu was elected ACFTU 
president at the Seventh Congress, apparently because he had been
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a Party generalist not specifically connected with the unions. He 
was brought into the unions as a Party man to correct the trend 
toward "trade unionism" both in the form of economism and in the 
form of organizational professionalism. By 1957 Lai himself was 
analyzing problems from the perspective of the unions.
Another question still not entirely answered is the degree of 
influence Lai was able to maintain during his illness in early 
1958. The general policy reversal came in mid-1957 and was par­
tially reflected and acknowledged in Lai's later addresses. Lai 
and his supporters had clearly been caught on the wrong side in
1957. By the time of the Trade Union Congress, policy changes 
were already being implemented. Decentralization of industry had 
been discussed at the Third Plenum of the Party's Central Committee 
in September and October of 1957 and began to be implemented in 
November. At the Trade Union Congress itself, the union constitu­
tion was amended to change the structural principle of the unions 
from strictly industrial (vertical) lines to both industrial and 
local area (horizontal) lines, thus facilitating control of union 
organs by corresponding Party organs. But the purge did not come 
until after Lai Jo-yli's death, at the rectification meeting prior 
to Liu's election as ACFTU chairman in August of 1958. At the 
Eighth Trade Union Congress, Lai had been reelected ACFTU Chairman, 
and Liu Ning-yi was not even reelected to a vice-chairmanship. 
According to T'an Hsin-wen, after Lai's death in May "the internal 
strife for the post [of chairman] was very keen."
One possible explanation for this sequence of events, offered 
by Paul Harper, is that the purge had been postponed to allow an 
amiable front at the Eighth Trade Union Congress and then further 
postponed until the death of Lai who was critically ill in early
1958. Perhaps another possibility is that as long as Lai was 
alive, he was able to protect himself and his faction, especially 
if he had support from within the top Party leadership. Also, if 
T'an Hsin-wen is correct, the Lai faction may still have been able
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to offer some resistance up to the time of the rectification con­
ference.
Chapter V
THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD, 1958-1960
At the Eighth Party Congress in September of 1956 the Chinese 
reassessed their application of the Soviet industrialization strat­
egy to their own situation. While industrial development was ad­
vancing well, the Chinese were disturbed by imbalances in their 
economy. The Soviet strategy involved the diversion of agricul­
tural resources into heavy industry with little or no reinvestment 
in agriculture. The Chinese Communists had inherited no grain sur­
plus, as the Bolsheviks had, but did inherit a large and rapidly 
growing population. Since there was no agricultural surplus to be 
exploited, agricultural output would have to be increased if a high 
level of industrial investment was to be continued.
By late 1957 the Party leaders were formulating a new economic
strategy for their second five-year plan. The strategy adopted was
to increase output in both sectors simultaneously. Heavy industry
was to retain priority in investment allocation, although agricul-
2tural investment did increase slightly. Output in agriculture and 
light Industry was to be increased on the basis of reducing waste 
and inefficiency and increasing labor productivity and labor pro­
duction. At the center of this strategy was the maximization of 
human effort by ideological incentives and political mobilization.
The general change in economic strategy introduced at this
time was accompanied by administrative decentralization of light
industry to the provincial level, effectively removing control
from the central ministries and placing it in the hands of pro-
3vincial Party committees. At the same time, the enterprise Party 
committees assumed complete control over operational as well as 
policy-making management functions in the factories.
57
58
With the assumption of complete enterprise leadership by the 
Party, reference to the independent organizational role of the 
unions ended. The new relationship between the Party and the un­
ions was epitomized in a KJJP editorial:
Trade unions are mass organizations of the 
working class and trade union work forms a 
part of the mass work of the Party. They 
are assistants of the Party in carrying out 
its work among the broad masses of workers.
Therefore, trade union organizations must not 
only be politically and ideologically depend­
ent upon the leadership of the Party, but also 
in organizational and business matters" Trade 
union organs at all levels must carry out 
their work under the leadership of Party com­
mittees of corresponding levels...^
To facilitate this change the unions underwent administrative de­
centralization from the provincial level down. Provincial unions 
delegated to the next lower levels powers of financial administra­
tion, organization, cultural and business administration, and 
authorization of administrative expenditures.^ The effect was to 
decrease vertical control within the union structure, and increase 
horizontal control by corresponding Party committees.
The unions retained no organizational independence after mid- 
1958 and therefore had no independent functions. Their role was 
to carry out Party tasks, under Party leadership, in cooperation 
with the Communist Youth League. Until mid-1959 even the unions' 
routine tasks were neglected. Union cadres were to assume the 
routine duties of Party committees, allowing those committees to 
concentrate on mobilizing the workers for production and the re­
organization of labor to support agriculture.^ At the same time 
the Party committees also assumed complete direction of the work­
ers' conferences, it was precisely this organizational change 
that Lai and his associates had apparently tried to avoid.
Following the major rectification campaign of 1957 the ACFTU 
had called on the unions to organize a production upsurge moti­
vated by an "unprecedented increase in labor enthusiasm" resulting
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from the rectification campaign and a socialist education campaign 
which had followed it. This introduced the industrial production 
phase of the Great Leap Forward. Its basic strategy was the max­
imization of human effort, nrativated by ideological incentive and 
F>olitical mobilization, to increase output without increasing cap­
ital investment. The tactics were: (1) to mobilize all potential
sources of labor, e.g., housewives, students and teachers, soldiers, 
merchants, and underemployed peasants; (2) to raise work attendance 
among regular workers; (3) to improve productivity among regular 
workers through socialist emulation, improvement in the organiza­
tion of labor, that is, reduction of personnel not directly par­
ticipating in production, increasing workers' skills, and technical 
innovation; and (A) to reorganize labor throughout the country.^
Thus, within industrial enterprises labor productivity would 
be increased by technical innovations, and actual production out­
put would be increased by mobilizing everyone available into labor- 
intensive campaigns. It would then be possible to reallocate part 
of the industrial work force to participate in agricultural produc­
tion and in newly formed small industries in rural and suburban 
areas. This reallocation or reorganization of labor was the first 
phase in the so-called worker-peasant system which survived into
O
the sixties and will be discussed in Chapter VI I.
The key to production efforts during this period was neither 
labor discipline nor emulation campaigns as such. It was the mass 
production movement, somewhat similar to organizing the entire in­
dustrial work force into emulation campaigns within emulation cam­
paigns and differing from earlier campaigns in three ways.
First, they were based almost entirely on political mobiliza­
tion rather than material incentives. In the second half of 1957, 
with the beginning of the anti-rightist and socialist education 
campaigns, political education increasingly dominated union atten-
Q
tion and shifted increasingly to the theme of class struggle.
During the Great Leap Forward itself, political education was taken
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over almost entirely by the Party committees, and political educa­
tion gave way to fervent exhortation. Wage levels were lowered 
and piece wages were largely eliminated as obstacles to effective 
political education.At the end of 1956 excesses in the wage 
and bonus increases adopted earlier that year were adjusted, and 
early in 1958 wages at the bottom of the industrial wage scale 
were reduced to bring them into line with rural wages. In part 
this reduction in lower-level industrial wages was to discourage 
migration to the cities. But the general freeze in workers' wages 
from 1958 through I960 was a reflection of the "politics in com­
mand" philosophy of the Great Leap Forward. But during the Great 
Leap period, unlike the Cultural Revolution, the marathon mobili­
zation of energies was still rationalized in terms of essentially 
material rewards; the Great Leap was to be a leap to a strong and 
prosperous new China.
Second, the mass production movement was much larger and more 
inclusive than earlier campaigns. Third, it was characterized by 
frantic activity with few organizational or regulatory guidelines. 
Since 1953 the trend had been toward increasing the planned organi­
zation of emulation campaigns and replacing shock tactics and 
quantitative output with technical innovation and quality control. 
These trends were now reversed.^' Regulations concerning work pro­
cedures were abandoned. Labor protection work did not receive any
public notice until April of 1959 when prolonged overwork and fail-
12ure to repair machinery began to seriously affect production. 
Technical innovation was officially an important part of the pro­
duction movement, but in November of 1959 the JMJP was still calling
for emulations based on innovations to supplement emulations based 
13on "hard work."
It was March of i960 before a major technical innovation cam­
paign was actually launched, and the emphasis remained on political
14
education even during that campaign. In any case, sophisticated 
technical innovation was largely precluded by the fact that many 
managers and engineers were sent down (hsia fang) to work in rural
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areas as part of the reorganization of labor and to allow the Party 
committees and workers freedom to "assault" production problems.
Chapter VI
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND SOCIALIST EDUCATION,
1961-1965
Although most of China's heavy industry had been excluded from 
the Great Leap Forward, by the end of i960 that campaign's policies 
had precipitated a crisis throughout the entire economy. The lack 
of coordinated planning, characteristic of the Leap period, had 
led to a chaotic situation. Misallocations of investment resources, 
including human resources, was perhaps the most damaging error. 
Natural disasters and the withdrawal of Soviet assistance exacer­
bated and climaxed the growing crisis. Decreased agricultural pro­
duction reduced the supply of raw materials for light industry, 
and shortages in food and clothing reached major proportions in the 
winter of I96O-I96I. Malnutrition and disease significantly affect­
ed attendance and productivity in all factories. The millenial 
enthusiasm which the cadres had been able to inspire in the workers 
during the Great Leap Forward was followed by disillusionment and 
apathy. ^
The policies of the Great Leap Forward were being reversed 
during i960, and this tendency was formally endorsed at the Ninth 
Plenum of the Party's Central Committee in January of I96I. New 
or restored policies were adopted at all functional levels. In 
terms of overall industrialization, strategy resources were re- 
allocated to emphasize agriculture. Planning was reinstituted, 
and the central ministries regained some of the authority they 
had lost. Factory managers and technical experts were recalled, 
and the "production units" themselves, that is, the restored fac- 
tory managers, gained a degree of autonomy."^ In effect, the sys­
tem of factory manager responsibility under collective Party
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leadership was restored, with the emphasis on the manager, "a sys­
tem of unified administration over production by the factory mana­
ger, so as to centralize leadership over all the production manage-
4ment activities of an enterprise."
Also during this period, the emphasis was once again on mater­
ial incentives, initially justified as a counter to absenteeism 
and lack of work enthusiasm, material incentives increasingly took 
the form of piece work wages and bonuses, first for work groups 
and later for individuals.^ The first general wage raise since 
1956 was announced in December of 1963.^
At the tenth plenum of the Party's Central Committee in Sep­
tember of 1962, this general orientation was partially reversed to 
emphasize class struggle, ideological indoctrination, and the po­
litical campaign or mass movement. Most of the earlier policies, 
however, remained in effect. Moreover, there was significant 
opposition among upper- and middle-level Party cadres and offi­
cials to a repetition of the Great Leap Forward.^
Transmission Belt
Beginning in the middle of 1959 the unions were directed to 
resume their routine tasks, but the rehabilitation of the unions 
was a slow process. They had atrophied organizationally, and 
through 1961 their first task remained to strengthen their own 
"organizational construction." They were also called on to devel­
op initiative in carrying out their own work; union cadres were to
overcome the attitude that "there is work when there is assignment
0from the Party, and there is no work when there is none."
This was not a return to organizational independence by any 
means. The unions were to continue to operate under Party leader­
ship organizationally as well as politically. Union cadres were 
to be trained in Party work by the Party cadres so that routine 
union work could be integrated with the "focal tasks" of the Party, 
and the Party committees were to continue to investigate union
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work. But total neglect of routine union tasks was now recognized 
as an error, in its usual manner of shifting the blame downward, 
the Party leaders attributed this "error" to "new branch secre-
9taries in the workshops."
To assure improvements in union performance, the pre-1958 sys­
tem of vertical supervision by higher-level organs was reintroduced 
in 1961,^^ but this applied only to internal administrative super­
vision. The dual structure that included both vertical and hori­
zontal responsibility and facilitated Party leadership over local 
union councils remained in effect.^' The list of functions specif­
ically assigned to the unions in I96I was essentially the same re­
curring list of routine tasks that had been assigned to them since 
1948-19^9: administrative work concerning the ongoing organization
of the unions themselves; workers' livelihood, particularly during 
this period running the workers' mess halls and dormitories and 
generally responding to workers' "small difficulties"; organizing 
workers' congresses; administering cultural and educational facili­
ties; and mobilizing the workers for production.
Production and Political Education
Production campaigns directly reflected the changed policies 
of the early sixties. While the press continued to refer to the 
possibility of combining strict scientific management with mass 
production movements, the emphasis changed to careful planning, 
taking the problems of individual workers into account, and the 
emulation of work techniques, as opposed to labor intensity and 
quantity output.
The unions did not reenter the field of political education in 
a big way until after the tenth plenum of the Party's Central Com­
mittee in September of 1962 which launched a Socialist Education 
Movement to intensify class struggle and anti-revisionism and to 
revolutionize China's youth in preparation for the death of the old 
elite. The unions were to refocus all their work to emphasize po­
litical education, utilizing their cultural and recreational
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facilities as "sharp tools" for political education. Three major 
themes emerged from the many but often vague and tangential direc­
tives given to union cadres during this period: class struggle,
self-reliance and hard struggle, and putting the collective inter-
12est above personal interests. Even after 1962, however, great 
efforts were made to avoid the excesses of the Leap period in pro­
duction campaigns. In detailed discussions of how to conduct those 
campaigns, the emphasis continued to be on quality, realism in set­
ting targets, "down to earth" technical reforms, respect for the
1 ^opinions of technicians, and proficiency in basic work skills.
In 1965 the Socialist Education Movement was intensified to
oppose continued passive resistance. Union organs had still failed
to convince some of their cadres that mass political movements did
lAnot hinder production. Similarly, many union cadres were contin­
uing to argue that routine union functions left no time for politi­
cal work, and that union participation in political work was unnec­
essary since it was already being carried out by Party committees 
and by the newiy instituted political departments.^^ The main op­
position to the intensification of political work in the factories, 
however, seems to have been based on a fear that the excesses of the 
Great Leap Forward would be repeated.
During the production upsurge of I965 emphasis on political 
education was once again intensified, and the unions were directed 
to be more active in mobilizing the workers.'^ The caution of pre­
vious campaigns, however, continued. The unions were to continue 
to emphasize industrial techniques, basic skills, and technical 
cooperation; to establish models and pace-setters; to include con­
crete summing-up work and assessments and comparisons; to base 
emulations on practical, down-to-earth experiences and the assign­
ment of specific tasks to individual workers; and to avoid the fab­
rication of production figures to enhance the apparent performance 
of their factories.All of these points referred to excesses 
that contributed to the chaos of the Great Leap Forward.
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Wei fare
During 1961-1962 union work focused on assisting the workers
to alleviate the disastrous effects of the Great Leap forward on
their own lives. Welfare expenditures were not increased, but union
cadres were to spend more time organizing the workers and workers'
18families for self-reliance and frugality. In 1962 welfare work 
was incorporated into the Socialist Education Movement in the fac­
tories. An austerity campaign, advocating self-reliance and putting 
collective interests above personal interests, was designed to con­
trol spending in 1963 when the economy was beginning to recover from 
the three hard years and commodities were beginning to reappear on
19the market.
More inclusively, an effort was made to replace welfare funds 
with political education of the earlier, socializing type rather 
than the frantic exhortation of the Great Leap Forward. With the 
Socialist Education Movement political education work was integrated 
with the general welfare function of going among the workers to un­
derstand their problems and showing concern and “class affection"
20for them. Assisting the workers with their small problems was 
increasingly emphasized as the key to effective political education. 
Part of this program was the effort to get full-time union cadres 
to participate in productive labor and to visit workers at home, 
culminating in the movement to relocate union offices in the “red
2dormitories" in which Party and union officials lived with workers.
In rural areas, where one focus of union work had been agriculture,
union cadres were sent to specific locations in the countryside to
live and work with the peasants and the workers in the agricultural
22machinery sub-stations. While these programs were not entirely
new in the sixties, it would appear that they were applied with more
23success during this period than they had been previously.
A second part of this program was reliance on activists to 
carry out union work at the basic levels. By 1956 the Chinese un­
ions had recruited over three million activists, and by 1958 the
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number was over three and one-half million. By comparison, there
were an estimated 60,87^ full-time union cadres in primary-level 
25unions in 1957. While the number of activists declined in I960
26and 1961, the effort to recruit them was renewed in 1962. This 
extensive use of activists allowed the regime to greatly expand un­
ion welfare services and also integrated large numbers of workers 
into an official national organization for active participation 
and administrative education.
Chapter VII
THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution climaxed the conflict 
between the Maoist line and other policy lines in China discussed 
in the introduction to this study. It should be remembered, however, 
that our knowledge of the rapid and complex changes after 1966 is 
still far from complete.
During the sixties the unions had once again become increas­
ingly professionalized as they had up until 1956-1957. This devel­
opment corresponded with other tendencies in Chinese society during 
the early sixties. Union structure had become dual again in 1961 
with the restoration of vertical responsibility within the union 
hierarchy. More importantly, the Party had become increasingly 
bureaucratized and professional, necessitating Mao's use of the 
Red Guards and, finally, the army to attack the Party itself. While 
the unions at various levels remained largely under the guidance of 
corresponding Party committees, changes in the Party itself allowed 
union resistance to the new line.
The Maoist labor policy, in contrast, can be summarized from 
his "Constitution of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company," originally 
written in I960, largely ignored during the early sixties, and re­
asserted beginning in 1965: politics in command. Party leadership,
emphasis on the mass movement, interchanging of tasks among cadres 
and workers, elimination of inhibiting rules and regulations, close 
cooperation among workers, technicians and functionaries, and tech­
nical innovation.' The similarity to the Great Leap Forward is 
obvious. Even technical innovation had been part of the formal 
strategy of the Great Leap Forward, even if largely ignored in prac­
tice. The basic difference was that during the Cultural Revolution
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Mao and Mao's thought effectively replaced the Party as the basis 
for leadership and the contents of poiiticai education.
The implementation of this policy began in the factories in 
1965 when the unions were called on to "promote democracy in pro­
duction." As this tendency increased, worker organizations once 
again came increasingly under Party control. With the advent of 
the Cultural Revolution, democratic worker organizations took their 
lead from Mao himself and were divorced from both the Party commit­
tees and the unions, actually replacing the unions in many factories 
in the form of revolutionary rebel groups. Before I966 these pro­
cesses evolved slowly. During 1965 Party leadership was emphasized 
in oniy one official union pronouncement, a KJJP editorial commem- 
orating the fortieth anniversary of the inauguration of the ACFTU. 
Even that editorial had not returned to the language of 1958-1959.
But by 1966 public directives to union cadres hardly mentioned 
Party leadership at all; they referred instead to "Mao's works" as
more important for successful union work than knowledge of union 
3work itself.
The shift from "politics in command" to "the thought of Mao 
Tse-tung in command" was formalized at the sixth session of the 
eighth executive committee of the ACFTU in April of I966. Since 
the beginning of the Socialist Education Movement the unions had 
been referred to by Lenin's phrase, "schools of communism." Now 
they were to become "a schooi for the fiexibie study and applica­
tion of the thought of Mao Tse-tung."^ In addition, this communique 
introduced other aspects of the Maoist policy; union cadres were to 
continue participating in productive labor, intensify mass supei— 
vision of their own work by workers' conferences, and downgrade 
material incentives. They were also to build a "large industrial 
army" in which distinctions between workers and peasants wouid be 
eiiminated.
On June 9» 1966, the ACFTU issued a notice to union organs at 
all levels to direct all their attention to the Cultural Revolution.^
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They were to organize the workers to study Mao's thought, partici­
pate In criticizing anti-Maoists already under attack, and expose 
anti-Maoists in union organizations. This was the last communique 
issued by the ACFTU, although articles did continue to appear over 
the name of various revolutionary rebel groups within the ACFTU.
New committees were established in some factories in early 1967 to 
take the place of the unions. In the Shanghai Glass Machinery Plant, 
for example, a "Revolution and Production Committee" was elected and 
put in charge of "political, production and trade union work."^
The unions were eliminated partly because of their opposition 
to the new line and partly because the new line called for new or­
ganizational structures untainted by past policies.^ On December 26, 
1966, a JMJP editorial announced the extension of the revolution to
industrial and mining enterprises as a new stage in the Cultural
0Revolution. In January of 1967 a group called the Shanghai Workers'
Revolutionary Rebels issued a "message to all Shanghai people"
announcing the seizure of Shanghai factories by revolutionary rebel,
9that is pro-Mao, groups. The Red Guards, however, met serious op­
position within industrial enterprises. The workers, unions, and 
management perceived a common interest in opposing the disruption 
of production and intrusion into the factories by the rebels. ^
The level of violence which resulted threatened production, and in 
March of I967 army units entered many factories to restore order 
and maintain production.
Initially at least, the major concerns of most workers seem to 
have been potential personal loss due to disruptions in production, 
acceptance of the authority of Party officials, most of whom were 
hesitant to abandon their factories and their fate to the Red Guards, 
and resentment against young students "barging into" the factories.'^ 
Workers seem almost unanimously to have opposed or avoided partici­
pating in Red Guard activity until November and December of 1966 
when the Cultural Revolution was officially extended to the factories. 
When the workers did assume leadership of the Cultural Revolution at
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the bidding of one of Mao's "latest directives" in August of I968, 
that event seems to have signaled a turning point away from student 
"ultra-leftism" and the beginning of the end of the Cultural Revo-
w 121ution.
According to Japanese and Czech correspondents, the ACFTU was 
replaced on December 26, I966, by the All-China Rebel General Group 
of Red Laborers. ^ While no organization continued to function con­
sistently under that title, the date corresponds to the formal in­
troduction of the Cultural Revolution into the factories. According 
to refugees from Canton and Shanghai, union dues were not collected
1Aafter early 1967. The ACFTU also abandoned its usually heavy in­
ternational program and was not represented at international Com­
munist labor meetings after December of I966.
According to one analysis, the old organization was initially 
maintained in name, and Liu Ning-yi was retained as chairman for 
international purposes only.'^ However, although Liu Ning-yi was 
subsequently attacked by the Red Guards he received significant pro­
motions in the Party hierarchy in both 1965 snd 1966, presumably on 
the basis of his loyalty to Mao on domestic issues.*^ His subse­
quent disappearance from the ranks of China's elite resulted from 
the position he took in I966 on China's foreign policy.^^
The ACFTU itself came under heavy attack early in 1967. China's 
previous labor policy was entirely ascribed to Liu Shao-ch'i's in­
fluence, and that policy was criticized on three counts.'® The 
first was that the unions had been welfare trade unions. Routine 
welfare amenities, the policy of concentrating on solicitude for 
the workers, and the awarding of prizes were all condemned as "sugai— 
coated arsenic." This was an aspect of Liu's economism.
The second general criticism was an attack on the unions as 
production trade unions. They had concentrated on production, en­
gaging the workers in a constant series of technical courses, les­
sons in basic work skills, and other production-oriented activities 
that took them away from studying Mao's works. The third general
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criticism was directed at the concept of a trade union of the entire 
people. The unions had accepted for membership reformed ex-capital­
ists, landlords and other bad elements, when in fact they should
19have performed as tools of class struggle.
A fourth criticism was introduced in 1968, namely, that in 1958
Liu had been forced to change his line and had therefore resorted
to a new trick, advocating the role of docile tools for the unions
to facilitate his own control over them. Essentially a description
of labor policy during the Great Leap Forward, this criticism was,
ironically, later used by rebellious workers who argued that their
own initiative in "making revolution" during working hours, helped
20the workers' organizations from becoming docile tools.
The Cultural Revolution was an extreme attack on previous in­
dustrial management systems and the Party structure itself, and in 
that context the total demise of the ACFTU is not surprising. Union 
opposition to the Cultural Revolution can be taken as prima facie 
evidence for the correctness of the Maoist attacks. Also, the 
theoretical principles of Mao's thought as expressed during the 
Cultural Revolution are in sharp contrast to the implicit theory 
on which union work in China had been conducted, whatever the pre­
cise role of Liu Shao-ch'i.
The basic assumption of that theory was that industrialization 
was prerequisite to political communization of the people. It was 
also assumed that attention to workers' livelihood would facilitate 
successful political education. In practice, a third assumption 
was employed, namely that in the case of individual workers or work 
groups, production effort was a relatively valid indicator of po- 
Hticai consciousness. Since political education and production 
were so intimately related in all union activities, and Individual 
unions were evaluated on the basis of plant production records, it 
would have been very difficult for the unions not to adopt this 
assumption for practical purposes. During 1965 union cadres began 
to receive warnings that production achievement was not necessarily
a sign of good political thinking, and that politics should be put
21first before production.
Despite some confusion on this point, generated by claims for
the magic of Mao's thought for increasing production, this point was
also a central theme early in the Cultural Revolution. Union cadres
were also warned at that time not to confuse soiicitude and solving
livelihood problems with "penetrating ideological work," as they 
22"had in the past." Ideally, both the conmunization of the people 
and industrial production would occur. "Grasping revolution" would 
enhance production, but revolution came first. "Our political work 
is not simply for guaranteeing the success of production; it is first 
of all for the success of the ideological revolutionization of man." ^
From the point of view of internal consistency, the logic of 
the attack on the unions during the Cultural Revolution was unassail­
able. Production effort might well be a function of material reward­
seeking and thus be antithetical to, rather than indicative of. 
Communist political consciousness. The disagreement, however, was 
a result of policy changes in the mid-sixties, centering on the con­
tent of political education. Previously the dominant message had 
been that present deprivation was necessary for the realization of 
long-range material interests, and Party programs seemed to support 
that message. That type of political education could also approxi­
mate the function of minimizing the alienating effects of prole­
tarianization. That is, political education had been designed pri­
marily to secure worker support for the regime, and the presentation 
of Party programs and goals had emphasized the material and patriotic 
benefits eventually accruing to the workers from Party leadership.
In this context the working assumptions prove true. Improve­
ments in livelihood and welfare seem to support the political message 
received by the workers, and acceptance of the political message in­
duces the workers to work harder and accept temporary sacrifices.
Thus, whatever Liu's role in formulating union policy, that policy 
was susceptible to the charges of economism and production in command.
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The unions had also always been a "trade union of the entire 
people." As early as 1953 Hsu Chlh-chen had spoken for the regime 
against closed doorism in union recruitment. With the nationaliza­
tion of industry in 1955-1956, many former owners were kept on as
salaried factory managers and, having become wage earners, were
24eligible for union membership. The difference between earlier 
periods and the Cultural Revolution was once again based on the 
nature of political education. The function of the unions had been 
to socialize all employees except hard core counterrevolutionaries 
to a position of general support for and cooperation with the regime, 
and only on special occasions to act as tools of class struggle. In 
the early stages of the Cultural Revolution that conception of so­
cialization was replaced by the attempt to both integrate and revo­
lutionize China's youth and workers to Mao's vision by struggle 
against specifically designated class enemies.
The new message of political education was, very roughly, that 
political self-cultivation, through studying Mao's works and Mao's 
thought, would create a nation of communist men, selfless and 
devoted, who would work harder and desire no personal remuneration 
in return. A massive upsurge in production would result, but it 
would be achieved by concentrating on Mao's thought, not by concen­
trating on production skills. Moreover, it would be achieved with­
out the sugar-coated arsenic of even the relatively limited personal 
amenities dispensed in the past so as to avoid contaminating the 
ideological transformation of men's minds.
It is not difficult to understand why many cadres resisted
attempts to apply Mao's vision. It fundamentally threatened Party
and other functionaries whose positions and working modes had become
25increasingly related to technlc.3l skills. It appeared as an ex­
treme form of the Great Leap Forward which had precipitated economic 
chaos and disaster. It also posed a direct and obvious threat to 
China's workers in its attack on economism.
In practice, the policy involved programs which included an
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overall reduction of workers' amenities. The most obvious was the
substitution of material incentives with politics in command. A
second example, more indicative of the complexities of the Cultural
Revolution and policy implementation in generai, was the peasant-
worker system. In April of 1966 the KJJP reported on the decisions
of the sixth session of the eighth executive committee of the ACFTU,
instructing the unions to create a large industrial army in which
distinctions between workers and peasants would be eliminated. The
ciosest actual policy to this instruction was the peasant-worker
system, in which peasants were contracted for temporary factory work
and permanent workers rotated places with peasants. This system
had also been widely employed in 1958-1959 in a reorganization of
labor policy associated with the Great Leap Forward. The system
had been in the news since 1962, and large-scale experimentation 
27had begun in 196^. By 1966 the establishment of a permanent ro­
tation system in some industries, such as mining and lumbering and 
similar rural and suburban operations, was apparently under consid­
eration.
A major advantage of the system was utiiization of peasants in 
industrial roles during slack farming seasons and part-time use of 
peasants in rural factories as it obviated permanent overstaffing
to accomodate emergencies and "heavy days," such as periodic cargo
1 28 unloading.
In addition to its advantages for allocating resources, the 
system complemented Mao's plan of geographically dispersing small 
industry and introducing the peasants to industrial life gradually. 
It was also ideologically consistent with Mao's efforts to minimize 
distinctions between workers and peasants, factories and the country 
side. However, those employees who were still concerned with in­
dividual wages must have seen the system as beneficial to the govern 
ment at their expense. Temporary workers and contract workers 
received lower pay and fewer fringe benefits than permanent workers. 
They were not eligible for union membership or for labor insurance 
benefits unless they were employed for a certain number of days
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29during the year. Since they were primarily day workers, they re­
quired no sleeping quarters from the factories. They did not bring 
dependents with them, but they did bring food rations from their 
communes, helping to alleviate the problem of urban food shortages.
Permanent workers could also be rotated out to communes to avoid
30payment of pensions. Moreover, by the sixties many of those 
serving as temporary and contract workers were not otherwise peas­
ants but were urban unemployed.
There were developmental advantages to the peasant-worker sys­
tem, and many of its worst aspects were due to abuses of the system 
rather than inherent flaws. Nevertheless, both temporary and perma­
nent workers had grievances against the system as well as its abuses. 
As a political issue it was manipulated during the Cultural Revolu­
tion by Maoists and anti-Maoists in efforts to woo first temporary 
workers and then permanent workers. It was finally abolished by
the Cultural Revolution Group in Peking and condemned as an exploi-
31tative scheme of Liu Shao-ch'i and Labor Minister Ma Wen-jui.
Chapter VIII
THE REAPPEARANCE OF THE TRADE UNIONS, 1973
Trade unions reappeared in Chinese factories only in 1973, well 
after the Party had resumed its primary role in China and months 
after the rehabilitation of the Communist Youth Leagued At the 
national level, the ACFTU had survived In name but had received 
virtually no mention for years; it has still not publicly reappeared, 
references having been limited to factory and provincial-level un­
ions. Even the role of representing Chinese workers internationally
has been played by Chinese Workers' Delegations rather than the 
2ACFTU. Much of this chapter is, therefore, devoted to outlining 
the context of factory/labor policies in which the unions have re­
appeared.
The main provisions of the Anshan Constitution were listed in 
the previous chapter to indicate basic features of the Maoist line 
in industry: Party leadership, politics in command, mass movements,
elimination of rules and regulations, interchangeability of tasks, 
technical innovation, and close cooperation among workers, tech­
nicians and cadres. Some of those policies could be realized only 
after the Cultural Revolution ended. Most important, of course, 
was the need to rebuild the Party and then to strengthen its leader­
ship role. Others were modified or consolidated, beginning espe­
cially in 1970, by restoring "good" rules and regulations and 
strengthening the role of management and accounting in the factories, 
emphasizing the role of veteran workers toward younger workers, 
attending to product quality as well as quantity, and increasing 
the role of experts in technical innovation to reach a cooperative 
balance. Nevertheless, politics remained in command.
To facilitate analysis, the various characteristics of the
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Anshan Constitution will, be discussed in terms of the interrelations 
among political education, production, administrative education, and 
transmission belt—the four activities or functions around which 
earlier chapters have been organized.
Political Education and Production
in Chapter VII conflict over union policy was analyzed in terms 
of alternate approaches to political education. The policy of poli­
tics in command since the Cultural Revolution has meant the primacy 
of political education over production and worker amenities, with 
class struggle as the focus of political education. Production would 
follow automatically but could not be pursued successfully for its 
own sake:
Under socialist conditions, workers should of 
course work hard because engaging in production 
and developing the socialist economy with great­
er, faster, better and more economical results 
is very important for consolidating the dictar 
torship of the proletariat, defeating capitalism 
and supporting the world's people in their 
revolutionary struggles. But, the struggle for 
production cannot be isolated from class struggle 
in class society. If we bury ourselves in work 
to the neglect of political line and class strug­
gle, production can never be run well.3
One must "grasp revolution, [to] promote production."
In terms of our earlier differentiation between nationalistic 
and communistic political education, however, Rensselear Lee has 
observed that those two themes have been combined in Chinese dis­
cussions about technology. The Chinese bourgeois expert relies on
foreign technology and is therefore identified with foreign economic
4exploitation. The workers' self-reliance furthers the class strug­
gle because it obviates relying on bourgeois experts, and it is 
patriotic because it is perforce indigenous.
Earlier in this study, incentive policy was discussed primarily 
in terms of material versus nonmaterial incentives. Politics in 
command means emphasizing political education over material
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incentives, and the Chinese press has not emphasized wages in recent 
years. The exceptions have tended to stress the absence of large 
wage differentials in Chinese factories.^ Additionally, the Maoist 
line assumes that political education will replace external incen­
tives, non-material as well as material, with internal or self-moti- 
vat ion.
The success of this effort is perhaps even more dependent on 
worker perceptions of their role in society and in the factories 
than the successful use of non-material external incentives, as 
discussed in the introductory chapter. In this sense, incentive 
policy reflects the interrelatedness of various aspects of the 
Maoist line. One factor in worker perceptions is the privileged 
position of workers in Chinese society. Even when material incen­
tives are not emphasized, improvements in general living standards 
are not neglected.^ Moreover, although efforts to minimize the gap 
between urban and rural income have been more successful in China 
than in other countries, Chinese workers are materially better off 
than the peasants. Perhaps more significantly, the wage differen­
tial between workers and those in more lucrative vocations is far 
smaller than in other countries.
Wage differentials between workers and other factory personnel 
is most directly relevant to this argument. Visiting thirty-eight 
firms in 1966, Barry Richman found that "at a majority of the enter­
prises surveyed, the ratio between the top pay and average enterprise
Q
pay was less than 2.5 to 1." Riskln, after visiting some of the 
same firms in 1972, suggests that this ratio has probably been re-
qduced even further. It is additionally significant that the aver­
age wages of workers are about the same as the average wages of 
technicians and cadres in the same factories.
In less material terms, the workers are also lauded as the 
leading class in Chinese society, a theme reemphasized again after 
a period of Red Guard and army prominence during the Cultural Revo­
lution.^^ The workers' perception of their role in Chinese society
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may also be Influenced by the prominent pioneering role they have 
played in developing new small industries at the hsien level, empha­
sizing once again the themes of self-reliance and indigenous tech- 
nology.
The workers' perceptions of their position in the factory may 
be influenced by wage differentials within each factory, as noted 
above, and three policies relating to participation and involvement 
in factory life. One such policy during this period has been the 
effort to encourage collective cooperation in work groups rather 
than individual competition among workers. A second policy has 
been the general informality in Chinese factories, encouraging 
workers to interact freely with staff, discussing production prob­
lems, etc., without regard to hierarchical chains of command.
A third policy involves the issue of worker participation in 
technology and in management. Worker participation relates directly 
to the interaction between political education and production inso­
far as it actualizes the political ideology and creates self-moti­
vation toward production. It is a form of political education.
Worker participation, however, has two additional purposes.
One is to train successors, that is, to prepare the workers to ad­
minister industry and society. This is a traditional Communist goal 
similar to what Lenin meant when he called the trade unions schools 
of administration. The other is to realize Mao's assumption that 
tapping the wisdom of the people will produce better results. Not 
only will participation enhance worker consciousness and technical 
ability; workers already have sufficient political insight and 
practical wisdom to contribute substantially to both factory man­
agement and technology.
As indicated above, perspectives on this issue have shifted 
during the past four years away from the extremes of the Cultural 
Revolution to the view that experts as well as workers do have a 
role to play in technological innovation and that clear divisions 
of responsibility have a place in factory management. At the same
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time, efforts to strengthen Party leadership have enhanced the role 
of Party committees in politically educating the workers. These 
shifts also mean more attention to formal efforts to educate workers 
for the tasks ahead. It is at this point that political education 
and administrative education come together, and the topic of actual 
worker participation will be deferred.
Political Education and Administrative Education
With politics in command, administrative education comes closer 
to political education than in other periods, since political con­
sciousness is seen as the major prerequisite for successorship.
During the past few years, great emphasis has been placed on train-
1^
ing successors among Chinese workers. Technicians and veteran 
workers are being encouraged to share their technical knowledge with 
others. ^ The major vehicle for technical education, however, has 
been the July 21 worker schools and colleges, instigated by a di­
rective by Mao on July 21, 1968. While many of these schools are 
part-time, several of them offer full-time two-year programs.
The political aspects of administrative education have empha­
sized class struggle and have centered around three major movements 
or campaigns: (l) to study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought;
(2) to criticize revisionism and rectify work style; and (3) to 
learn from the wel1-publicized model of the Tach'ing oil fields. 
Various policy aspects overlap in these campaigns. Organized as 
mass campaigns by the Party committees, the first two combine to 
emphasize class struggle through studying Mao and repudiating re­
visionism. The campaign to criticize revisionism and rectify work
style predominated in 1973, one factory reporting fourteen large
18criticism meetings since 1972. This movement also linked class
struggle and political education to production by mobilizing workers
19to rectify their own work style. The campaign to learn from 
Tach'ing extended this linkage to both production and factory rela­
tions by advocating the application of Mao's thought within an in­
tegrated model for industry, a model overtly representing the Maoist
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line as opposed to the Liu Shao-ch'i line. In this way, the three 
campaigns complement one another and reflect Maoist priorities con­
cerning the interrelationships among class struggle, intrafactory 
relations, and production.
In another sense, however, in the seventies the emphasis on 
class struggle has had unity as a major theme as well: "Unite, don't
split." On the one hand, some role for experts in technology and 
management has been advocated. On the other hand, presumably in­
creased technical knowledge and raised political consciousness would 
prepare the workers practically and psychologically to cooperate 
with technical, engineering, and managerial staff on an equal rather 
than subservient basis, thus facilitating cooperation. One mani­
festation of this possibility has been the so-called three-in-one 
combination of workers, technicians, and cadres into functional 
groups for such endeavors as technical innovation.
Worker Participation
The provisions of the Anshan Constitution assume that political 
education, technical innovation, factory management, and production 
should be integrated aspects of a single undertaking, with minimum 
role differentiation among workers, cadres, and technicians. In 
practice, worker participation in technology and management takes 
two forms: participation by the workers as a whole, and the selec­
tion and preparation of individual workers for promotion to techni­
cian or cadre status. The July 21 schools, discussed above, are 
designed to train workers to be technicians, and a significant num­
ber of workers have been promoted to technician status in recent 
21years. Perhaps the major form of worker participation in tech­
nology, however, has been the three-way combinations involved in 
technical innovation.
First introduced in 1965, the three-in-one approach has gone
through three stages. Initially, technicians seem to have played
22the major if underpublicized role. During the Cultural Revolu­
tion, emphasis on worker initiative and self-reliance accompanied
85
class struggle against experts and professionals. During the seven­
ties the role of experts has reemerged. The present line is summar­
ized by Hung Ch'i as follows: Technical innovation must continue
to rely on the masses and on worker initiative through the three- 
way combinations to “wipe out the pernicious influence of 'operation 
of factory by experts.'" Technicians must participate, but they will 
need guidance to avoid conservatism: “Technicians must be encouraged
to engage in technical Innovation and scientific experimentation
boldly...[they must be used and] asked to transform themselves at 
23the same time." Like many of the policies discussed in this chap­
ter, the three-way combinations for technical innovation combine
the themes of class struggle and national integration, political ed-
2k
ucation and intra-factory cooperation.
The emphasis has been the reverse with respect to worker par­
ticipation in management, with promotion of workers to cadre status 
predominating over direct participation in management by the workers 
as a whole. As evinced throughout this study, no sustained efforts 
have been made to institutionalize direct worker participation in 
management. As Paul Harper has also argued, breaking down the 
boundaries between workers and staff has been achieved primarily by
cadres and technicians spending time in the workshops participating
25in productive labor.
The period since the Cultural Revolution has been characterized,
however, by a major campaign to recruit workers into cadre positions,
comparable in scope perhaps to the time shortly after 19^9. I rt
major industrial cities like Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin, twenty
to forty thousand promotions since the Cultural Revolution have been
reported, while similar figures have been reported for some pro- 
26Vinces. These figures are not broken down and presumably include
promotions to technician status. Many of them seem to be promotions
to membership on factory Revolutionary Committees and, more recently,
27factory Party and trade union committees. Within factories, the 
theme that workers are now the masters of their own enterprises 
has meant that now most officials are also production workers or
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ex-workers.
There has also been a corresponding increase in recruitment of
28workers for Party membership. At the highest level, the numbers 
of production workers or ex-workers elected to the Party's Central 
Committee seems to have increased along with the decrease in mili­
tary representation from the Ninth to the Tenth Party Congresses. 
Most significant, and publicized, was the appointment of Wang Hung- 
wen as a vice-chairman of the Political Bureau and major figure 
among the top leadership. Two additional workers, Wu Kuei-hsien 
and Ni Chih-fu were elected alternate Political Bureau members.
The list of new provincial trade union chairmen elected in 1973 in­
cludes a very high proportion of Central Committee members, most of
29whom seem to have emerged during the Cultural Revolution. The 
new union committees at local levels seem also largely staffed by 
workers.
Party-Trade Union Relations and Trade Union Tasks
Trade unions have reemerged in a context of Party committee 
leadership in Chinese factories. The Party committees make major 
decisions concerning political line, ideology, and production.
The Revolutionary Committee in each factory is responsible for day- 
to-day administration of policy. In the absence of trade unions. 
Workers Representative Congresses had assisted the Party committees 
organize and mobilize the workers for study, discussion about pro­
duction, recreation and welfare activities, and working with female 
workers. The reconstituted unions are inheriting these tasks.
Party committees organized the elections of the renewed unions
and carried out preparatory rectification and education programs.
The reports from the conferences at which various provincial union
committees were elected all stressed the need for strengthened Party
leadership over the unions and the role of unions as assistants to
the Party, providing an organizational link between Party and work-
31ers. The new unions are being admonished not to repeat past 
errors such as neglecting class struggle and emphasizing livelihood
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32and production over ideological work. Under Party leadership they 
are to organize and unite the workers to carry out class struggle.
Under this general heading and in this general spirit or over­
all orientation, more specific union tasks are emerging. Political 
education is the key, especially the organization of workers to 
study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought and criticize revision­
ism. Still more specifically, the unions are assuming a role in 
training successors like running factory schools and participeting 
in worker promotion, that had previously been assigned to Party com-
3A
mittees.
In addition to education, the unions are also resuming their 
major role in the administration of workers' welfare, including 
decisions about welfare distribution, women's work, visiting work­
ers to demonstrate their solicitude, and recreational activities. 
They are also to see that production work is done well, organizing 
the workers to exercise self-reliance and hard work, and to grasp 
revolution and promote production. Finally, they are to participate 
in supervising cadres to follow the Party line and Party policies.
In summary, the unions have reemerged to perform a relatively 
balanced functional role under close Party leadership, albeit with 
ideological work rather than production or welfare still publicized 
as the key. Possibly the reemergence of the unions at this time 
is itself indicative of the more balanced orientation in Chinese 
factories during the past few years which seems to reflect a re­




In this study, Chinese Communist union and labor policy has 
been divided into seven periods, it can also be anaiyzed in terms 
of three models.
The First Model
During three of the six periods up through the Cultural Revolu­
tion, Chinese unions have had several functions. Although production 
was at the center of their work, they were also engaged in transmis­
sion belt, political education, and administrative activities.
The first application of this model came during 19^9~1952 when 
the regime was consolidating its victory. The unions were more in­
dependent of direct Party control and more versatile in the range 
of tasks performed than during any other period. But they exper­
ienced no early period of confusion and open debate on the relation­
ship between Party and unions, as the Bolsheviks had. The Party 
came to power with an established organizational infrastructure 
relatively prepared to control the entire country politically, and 
with a pre-established policy of Party leadership over the unions. 
Political education during this period emphasized national integra­
tion, to wit, the necessity for active participation in production 
to transform China into an industrialized nation, respect for the 
working class as the "leading class" in society and the resulting 
responsibilities of the working class, reference to specific bene­
fits accruing to the workers since the Party came to power, such 
as the labor insurance program, patriotism, especially in connection 
with the Korean War, characterization of the Party as the only lead­
ership group capable of creating a strong industrialized China,
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creation of a high degree of 61an, a spirit of all working together 
to build the new China.
The unions were a transmission belt for Party policies and were 
used by the Party for attacks on capitalists during the san-fan 
wu-fan movement as well as for general overseeing of capitalist ac­
tivities. As "schools of administration," the unions administered 
worker welfare programs and literacy education, organized new un­
ions, and participated In the massive promotion of workers to cadre 
and industrial line-staff positions. To "defend workers' interests, 
they organized active, if controlled, worker participation in con­
ferences and councils and organized the workers for "mass super­
vision" of management.
The second application of this model came during 1955~1957 with 
the reinstitution of collective leadership in Chinese factories. 
Emulation campaigns emphasizing political education returned to 
prominence. Workers' conferences were restored, and new efforts 
were made to increase the number and role of worker activists. Also 
the wage reform of 1956 brought with it increased attention to wel­
fare functions. It was overtly argued that successful political 
education depended on looking after the workers' welfare and 1ive- 
1 i hood.
From 1961 to 1963, the first model reappeared in a slightly dif 
ferent form. During the Great Leap Forward, the unions had been 
weakened organizationally by a reduction in union administrative 
tasks and by the performance of political education and production- 
mobilization tasks directly by the Party. In I96I the unions began 
to rebuild, to "strengthen their organizational construction," and 
to resume their routine tasks, that is, the various tasks assigned 
to them during 19^9~1952 and 1955~1957. The "three hard years" of 
i960 to 1962 precluded a wage reform until finally a minor one was 
instituted in 1963. To compensate, new emphasis was placed on 
assisting the workers with their personal difficulties and being 
solicitous of workers' welfare. In this same direction, union
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cadres were to work and live with the workers, creating a spirit of 
common effort.
The Second Model
The second model of trade union performance appeared during 
China's first five-year plan. Chinese factories copied the Soviet 
one-man management system, and union functions were curtailed as 
they had been in the Soviet Union under that system. While the 
various union functions were not entirely eliminated, union activity 
focused almost exclusively on production. Workers' conferences 
atrophied, and management control was strengthened for the applica­
tion of strict labor discipline. In general, this model is compar­
able to the pattern of union performance in the Soviet Union under 
Staiin.
The Third Model
The Great Leap Forward introduced the third model which is 
characterized by extreme reliance on political education to Increase 
production. Work rules and material incentives alike were down­
graded as the application of political education was transformed in­
to personal exhortation and "shock" mobilization in which the unions 
were largely by-passed in favor of direct Party contact with the 
workers. Both workers and cadres worked on the production floor, 
and both cadres and workers "managed" from the production floor. 
Political education, however, retained an "economistic" tint, by 
stressing that this was to be a Great Leap Forward to material abun­
dance.
This model reappeared during the Cultural Revolution. Material 
incentives were downgraded, and even production was no longer the 
focus of factory and union life. Political education, now defined 
as Mao's thought, took command once again.
Concluding Evaluation
The Stalinist response to the problems of industrialization
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under the second model has seemed inappropriate to China. It empha­
sized resources that the Chinese have not had, especially technical 
expertise, and negated China's major potential assets of labor 
power, the creative power of ideological or political mobilization, 
and the Party itself. While the Chinese have attempted to create 
a large body of technical experts, it has been a very slow process. 
This model also relies heavily on control and coercion and thus pre­
cludes voluntary participation and successful political education 
for most workers. Since it has been rejected by China's leaders 
since the mid-fifties, it need not detain us here.
With the exception of that period, Chinese trade union policy 
has alternated between the first and third models. Those alterna­
tions have mirrored broader political-economic conflicts between 
Mao and other Party leaders. It is tempting, therefore, to see one 
of them as the Maoist model. It is, however, more fruitful and, I 
think, more correct to see the first and third models in a dialec­
tical relationship.
In the first place, there are limits to the degree of control 
a single leader or a group of leaders can exercise over an entire 
policy area. Beyond that, however, Mao has expected and attempted 
a pattern of political intensification and relaxation or a "leap 
forward" followed by consolidation at a higher level as changes 
occur, for example, in China's technology and the political con­
sciousness of her leaders and people. It would also appear that 
Mao's own views on policies for industry and labor have 
changed with experience. In this sense, the third model can be 
viewed as a necessary but temporary application of extreme policies 
to correct imbalances. Moreover, some of the extremes of the Great 
Leap Forward can be attributed to inexperience, not only on the 
part of local cadres but also Mao himself, while some of the ex­
cesses of the Cultural Revolution can be attributed to the gravity 
of the overall situation as Mao perceived it.
In this perspective, the last few years can be seen as another
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period of consolidation in a continuing process or as walking on two 
legs at a dialectically higher level. Trade unions have not been 
reestablished long enough to allow analytical perspective on this 
period. Looking primarily at the orientation of factory policy, 
however, it appears to fit the first model, with the major exception 
that to date, at least, political education continues to be empha- 
sozed over production.
As detailed in the previous chapter, this period seems charac­
terized by a multi-functional policy that focuses on a kind of po­
litical education that combines ideological education with technical 
innovation, class struggle with national self-reliance, and class 
struggle with unity and cooperation. In addition, the Party is once 
more in command but presumably rectified by the Cultural Revolution 
and mass recruitment of workers for Party membership and into lead­
ing factory positions. The following evaluations should be informed 
by that perspective.
The extreme politics in command response to the problems of in­
dustrialization has had major limitations. The almost total abandon­
ment of technology, regulations, and statistical control during the 
Great Leap Forward resulted in economic disaster, and although a 
major effort was made to avoid those errors during the Cultural 
Revolution, an inherent incompatibility is evident.
In terms of labor policy, an attempt to create Communist work­
ers by short-term ideological exhortation seems unrealistic. Mobil­
ization for common action is possible only when common Interests 
are evident, necessitating a prolonged process of education and ex­
perience. Even over the long run, it has seemed to many observers 
that the industrialization process itself depends on the efficiency 
provided by a division of labor and routinization of role performance, 
in addition to technology, mechanization, and rationalization. This 
view, however, is no longer universally held even in the West.
Unmodified applications of the first model have also involved 
at least two problems. One is that successful implementation has
9^
been difficult even when this model has been the official policy.
The other is Mao's critique of what this model has led to in the 
past, even when it was successfully implemented. The two are 
closely related since a number of the practical difficulties seem 
to be inherent in the policy itself, at least in the China of the 
fifties and sixties.
In practice it involves a delicate balance of spontaneity and 
control that has been difficult to maintain with an unsophisticated 
work force, a very limited budget for consumption and incentive 
purposes, and cadres with tendencies toward self-entrenchment and 
concentration on their own prerequisites. The major threats to that 
balance have been posed by the Party's insistence on exercising 
effective power in all areas of Chinese life and by the fact that 
production has been at the center of union work.
The Party has consistently acted as a central elite allocating 
duties but no political power to other elite groups and organiza­
tions such as the unions. The ACFTU as an organization has played 
little if any role in China's central economic planning. Any effort 
by the unions towards organizational independence has met the Party's 
almost pathological fear of syndicalism. At lower decision-making 
levels the pattern has been similar. For example, during periods 
like the Great Leap Forward when workers' councils have been pro­
minent, it has been the Party committees and not the workers that 
have actually been in control.
In performing the transmission belt function, union cadres have 
consistently been caught in the middle. Lack of union independence 
or leverage has made it extremely difficult for the unions to com­
municate up to the center. Carrying out directives from above to 
the neglect of representing the workers has caused union cadres to 
lose the workers' respect and thus inhibited their ability to com­
municate down effectively. In avoiding economlsm and its logical 
corollary, syndicalism, the unions have had a continuing problem 
with bureaucratism and with abject reliance on the Party and
95
general ineffectiveness.
Given China's economic situation, it has no doubt also been un­
avoidable that union performance has been evaluated primarily in 
terms of production output. This characteristic is shared with other 
developing countries. It has, nevertheless, forced the unions to 
neglect other duties such as educating the workers, maintaining 
safety rules, and upward communication. It has also led to profes­
sionalism at the expense of an orientation to political education. 
Union cadres have, of course, been led to professionalism by their 
own task orientation, but the professionalism of preferring tech­
niques, skills and material incentives over political education to 
achieve the production quotas demanded from above has also reflected 
the practical realities of the industrializing process, reenforced 
by the economic disaster resulting from the Great Leap Forward.
This tendency toward professionalism has also been encouraged 
by the unions' administrative tasks. After production, welfare and 
other administrative tasks have been the most consistently observ­
able activities of Chinese unions, despite limitations on the avail­
ability of welfare funds and despite periodic attacks on material 
incentives for ideological reasons. Administration of workers' in­
surance has always been entirely in the hands of the unions. They 
have assisted the Party in recruitment and promotion programs, es­
pecially during the early years of the regime, and union activist 
work has been a significant route for promotion into the Party and/ 
or line-staff administrative positions. Chinese unions have also 
consistently been assigned a role in the administration of spare­
time education and apprenticeship programs, and the number of workers 
participating in these programs has been extremely large.
For these reasons, union cadres have been ever present in the 
lives of the workers and have played a major role in urbanizing and 
integrating them into industrial society. But by demanding so much 
of their time, administrative tasks have also led the unions into 
bureaucratism and professionalism. This, in turn, has affected the
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kind of political education the workers have received.
We have repeatedly noted that professionalization has conflicted 
with political education. Moreover, the function of political ed­
ucation has involved its own internal conflict between the two goals 
of socialization and communication. As used here and defined in 
Chapter I, socialization means political education designed to so­
cialize the Chinese workers to an acceptance of the Communist re­
gime and its nationalistic and industrialization goals and programs. 
Communization means political education designed tc educate Chinese 
workers to an acceptance of the ideology or world view of Marxism- 
Leninism as interpreted by Mao Tse-tung. Before the Cultural Revo­
lution, both socialization and communization were attempted simul­
taneously, with the emphasis on socialization except during the 
Great Leap Forward.
Theoretically these two goals are not inconsistent, and in prac­
tice they are interrelated in many ways. But the potential for con­
flict between them is also high. The attempt at socialization has 
been closely related to the question of worker amenities. A major 
basis for integration into the society has been the ability to 
demonstrate to the workers that the Communist regime and its pro­
grams are advantageous to the workers in a concrete way. Its effec­
tiveness has been directly related to the professional orientation 
toward technical skills and material incentives that has seemed 
most successful in advancing Chinese industrialization in general 
and workers' welfare in particular. Communization, especially in 
its extreme Maoist form, depends on a reorientation of men's de­
sires away from material benefits and is therefore antithetical to 
a system of material incentives.
The evaluation above is concerned principally with problems of 
implementing the labor policy designated here as the first model.
The Maoist critique of that model has focused on its inherent limi­
tations. At the concrete level this has meant political education 
rather than material incentives and concentration on production
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skills, and Maoist ideology rather than political socialization.
That topic is discussed next, followed by a brief exploration of the 
broader issues involved in the Maoist alternative.
The practical argument for a professional approach to increased 
productivity would seem to be that increased productivity depends on 
labor discipline. Labor discipline can be created by nonmaterial in­
centives. The effectiveness of contributive incentives, however, is 
conditional and will depend in large measure on the workers' view 
of their own position in society. Wage levels, the degree of tech­
nical skill and general education of the work force, and the degree 
to which the workers are subjectively integrated into society will 
all be relevant to that view. Thus, the effectiveness of contribu­
tive incentives will depend on effective socialization. This is an 
argument for political education as socialization.
Finally, labor productivity is a function not only of labor 
discipline or intensification of labor but also and even primarily 
of Industrial technology, mechanization, and rationalization. In­
sofar as this argument is correct, it also supports the professional 
approach. This approach will also be pushed, of course, by those 
with an interest in the establishment of professional or performance 
criteria rather than political criteria to protect their own favored 
positions.
The ideological objection to the professional approach has 
already been simply stated: Communization depends on a reorienta­
tion of men's desires away from material benefits and is therefore 
inhibited by reliance on material incentives and skill quotas. It 
is also inhibited by professionalization in a broader sense. This 
view assumes that the ultimate aim in China is concerned with re­
lationships among people. In order to maintain a Communist eco­
nomic structure, China must industrialize. But if the means of 
achieving industrialization lead one on the revisionist path of 
the Soviet Union, then achieving Communism will be precluded. If, 
on the other hand, the means to industrialization can be communistic
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then Communism can be achieved.
This objection to the professional approach has a positive side 
also. An effective policy of wage incentives depends on the avail­
ability of consumer goods without which monetary wages are not mean­
ingful. At the same time, contributive incentives are most effective 
as marginal additions to an effective monetary incentive policy. The 
Maoist answer to this dilemma would seem to be that contributive in­
centives are indeed marginal and conditional. They are, in fact, 
inadequate to the tasks of industrialization without advances in 
technology and in the ability to simultaneously provide strong ma­
terial incentives.
Communization, on the other hand, does not depend on a concur­
rent system of effective material incentives. Labor discipline is 
achieved because of successful communization, and the communist man 
is impervious to the absence of material incentives. It will in­
clude, for example, internal or self-motivation. At the same time, 
communizatIon in the broader sense, represented by the attack on 
the Party and the professionals during the Cultural Revolution, will 
improve social and political conditions for successful political 
education by sweeping away an entrenched bureaucracy. This act will 
itself change the workers' view of their role in the society by re­
solving or at least continuing to deal effectively with the distinc­
tions between top and bottom and between bureaucrats and workers. 
Thus, in addition to its superiority in achieving the goal of a 
communist society, communization may also be more effective in 
achieving an industrialized society.
At a broader level, this is part of Mao's resistance to the 
assumption that industrialization depends on a sharp division of 
labor, role distinctiveness, and routinization and that industrial­
ized societies must be integrated on that basis. According to the 
Maoist view, those characteristics will in fact lead to differen­
tiation between leaders and followers and, in the factories, between 
managers and workers, with major consequences for personal relations
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and perceptions. Managers and cadres, on the one hand, and workers, 
on the other hand, will be unable to relate as communist or social­
ist brothers. Contradictions between top and bottom will Intensify 
and become entrenched. Different groups will also perceive differ­
ently the stakes of what should be a common undertaking. Managers 
will seek highest output at lowest cost, filling and overfilling 
quotas with least Interference and least expenditure of energy and 
personal risk. The workers will attempt to maximize their pay and 
minimize their work effort. Under a piece wage system, for example, 
they will sacrifice quality to quantity, and with standard wages 
they will cut corners to minimize their own work regardless of con­
sequences to the products or overall production except to meet for­
mal or informal minimum standards. These examples are from the 
factory but have their homologues in the national political arena.
As an alternative, Mao has insisted on integration through 
ideological unity. To achieve that unity he has looked to common 
struggle and to interchanging role performance, both reminiscent 
of the practical necessities of the Yenan period. The common enemy 
to be struggled against has been either ideologically defined class 
enemies or economic bottlenecks, and the military terminology during 
production campaigns has been deliberate. Interchanging role perfor 
mance aims at common understanding and assumes that perceptions are 
conditioned by role assignment. The tasks that a person is respons­
ible for in a society or enterprise, program, or process will 
strongly condition his perceptions and orientation to that institu­
tion or activity. The worker-peasant system, the factory policy of 
having cadres share In productive labor and workers participate in 
technology, and the hsia-fang program are all attempts to eliminate 
rigid role differentiation and encourage common understanding.
In a similar way, a case can be made for Mao's general indus­
trialization strategy on both political and economic grounds. The 
major characteristic of that strategy has been geographically dis­
persed enterprises under a system of bureaucratically decentralized
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economic planning and emphasizing intra-factory self-reliance. 
Bureaucratic decentralization of planning is an approach to resolv­
ing problems of information gathering and processing in a complex 
economy that seems appropriate to China's priorities and present 
stage of development. Intra-factory self-reliance is not simply 
a necessary concomitant to geographical dispersal. It also facili­
tates active worker participation in technical Innovation, decreases 
the need for capital intensity in major portions of the industrial 
sector, and potentially introduces all factory personnel to modern 
technology in a more profound way than importing techniques and 
equipment from abroad.
The potential advantages of geographical dispersal are also 
more inclusive than the publicized military pose involved in regional 
self-sufficiency. Building industrial plants in the interior, close 
to raw materials, may or may not be less economical than transporting 
materials to established industrial complexes on the coast. Many of 
the small industries primarily involved in this dispersal, however, 
directly serve agriculture, and there is, therefore, value in locat­
ing them in rural areas. Moreover, it serves the political goal of 
breaking down the differences between urban and rural areas by in­
troducing the peasnats to industrial culture as well as facilitating 
part-time use of peasants in small industries during off-seasons. 
Finally, this latter advantage can be realized without the debili­
tating effects of an excessive rate of urbanization or population
ifmigration to urban centers.
The Cultural Revolution is now over although its effects will 
be felt in China for years to come. A new effort is underway to 
find a labor policy that will integrate both technology and worker 
initiative, that will accelerate industrialization without the re­
visionist side effects that for Mao characterize Soviet experience, 
and that will integrate "the three revolutionary movements of class 
struggle, production struggle, and scientific experiment." It may 
be that Mao's attempt to create and maintain ideological unity is 
a populist dream, inappropriate to industrialized society, but thus
2
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1949- 1954: Chinese Workers March Toward Socialism, 
i4.
1956: "China's workers and employees: Some
figures," Shihshih Shout'se, No. 8 
fApril 21. 1957). in ECMM, No. 88.
1957: Chunqkuo Kungjen, No. 4 (1958), cited by 
T'an Hsin-wen, "Labor union movement," in 
Communist China, 1949-1959, 60.
1958: Liu Ting-yi, "Exert greater efforts and 
win a greater victory," KJJP, May 1, 1959 
in SCMP, No. 2016.
1963, 1965: Peking Review, April 30, 1965*
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1949 2,373 3,004 26,267 8,004
1950 5,170 30,314 10,239
1951 7,297 34.730 12,815
1952 10,200 4,939 36,752 15,804
1953 12,229 6,188 39,116 18,256
1954 12,454 6,408 39,750 18,809
1955 6,477 38,864 19,076
1956 13,720 8,626 39,366 24,230
1957 16,300 9,008 39,667 24,506
1958 17,400 25,623 56,867 45,323
1959 44,156
i960 45,960
Sources: (1) Appendix A; (2) Ten G reat Years, 128; (3) Emerson,
"Employment in Mainland China," Table A-1; (4) 1949“ 
1958: Emerson, "Employment in Mainland China," Table
A-2; 1959“1960: Chen, Chinese Economic Statistics.
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Groups (3) Activists (4)
1949
1950 683,000 208,000 19,000
1951 2,380,000
1952 2,820,000




1955 316,000 21,000 2,730,000
1956 1,259,000 114,000 3,200,000
1957 1,078,000 106,000 3,482,000*
1958 2,441,000 199,000 3,490,000
Sources: (1) "Fiqures and Facts," JMJP, May 1, 1955
T63: (2^andf3) Ten Great Years, 129; *374,
, in CB, No.
300 "model
and advanced" workers, in "China's trade union organiza­
tion makes rapid expansion during the past year," NCNA 
Peking, April 29, 1955, in CB, No. 363; also 153,900 
"model" and 220,AOO "advanced" workers [total: 37^,300]
in Chinese Workers March Toward Socialism, 22; (4) 1955: 
"ACFTU decision on strengthening activists' work," in 
CB, No. 363; 1956: "Notification of ACFTU on convening
national conference of representatives of trade union 
activists," KJJP, June 28, 1956, in SCMP, No. 1337; 1957: 
"Trade union conference opens," NCNA Peking, August 21, 
1957, in SCMP, No. 1597; *3,890,000 activists, Hsu Chih- 
chen, "Work of Chinese trade unions during past four 
years," KJJP. November 22, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1665; 1958: 
"Exert greater efforts and win a greater victory," KJJP , 
May 1, 1959, in SCMP, No. 2014.
In comparison with the figures of 3,482,000 or 3,890,000 
trade union activists in 1957, the number of full-time 
trade union cadres that year was 60,874 in local, Indus 
trial and primary Jevel unions. "China's workers and 
employees: Some figures," Shihshih Shout'se, No. 8
(April 21, 1957), in ECMM, No. 88.
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D. Workers Promoted
A. Promotions to cadre status
1. 1950-1953, workers promoted to cadre positions in Party and 
government organs totaled 107,000; workers promoted to trade 
union organs above the basic level totaled 111,000. "Opening 
address by Liu Ning-i," Seventh All-China Congress of Trade 
Unions.
2. 1953, workers promoted to cadre positions in Party and govern­
ment organs and trade union organs above the basic level 
totaled 12,^3^. "Marked success made by Chinese workers on 
production front in first year of five-year plan," NCNA Peking, 
April 30, I95A, in SCMP, No. 806.
3. 195^, workers promoted to cadre positions:
a. 3,600 to Party organs
b. 7,600 to government organs
c. 1,850 to trade union organs above basic level
d. 1,A00 to Youth League committees
e. 7,080 to other organizations
"China's trade union organization makes rapid expansion during 
the past year," NCNA Peking, April 29, 1955; "The development 
made in China's labor movement in 195^," KJJP, April 29, 1955; 
both in CB, No. 363.
B. Promotions within industrial enterprises
1. Directors
a. 1950-1953: 7,800. "Opening address by Liu Ning-i,"
Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions.
b. 195^: 1,300. "Development made in China's labor movement
in 195^," op. cit.
c. 1955: 1,100. "280,000 outstanding workers in China,"
NCNA Peking, April 28, 1956, in SCMP, No. 1280.
2. Industrial enterprise staff (shop managers, engineers, tech­
nicians, etc.)
a. 1950-1953: 12^»,000. "Opening address by Liu Ning-i,"
Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions.
b. 195^: 17,650, 7,200 of whom were shop chiefs. "Develop­
ment made in China's labor movement in 195^," op. cit.
c. 1955: A,300 shop managers. "280,000 outstanding workers
in China," op. cit.
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I9A9 600 8,004 3,004 2,373
1950 1 ,400 10,239 5,170
1951 2,600 12,815 7,297
1952 3,300 15,804 4,939 10,200
1953 4,800 18,256 6,188 12,229
195^ 5,380 18,809 6,408 12,454
1955 5,710 19,076 6,477
1956 7,417 24,230 8,626 13,720
1957 11,500 24,506 9,008 16,300
1958 13,779 45,323 25,623 17,400
Sources; 1nsurance Coverage: Ten Great Years, 149. For the




1. Alexander Eckstein has estimated that Soviet national income
in 1928, on the eve of the Soviet first five-year plan, was 
17^ above that of China in 1952 and that per capita income was 
four times that of China. "Moscow-Peking axis: The economic
pattern," in Boorman et al., Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths
and Strains. For an even higher estimate of Soviet superior­
ity, see Zauberman, "Soviet and Chinese strategy for economic 
growth," International Affairs, XXXVIII (July I962), 339"352.
2. Industry was essentially socialized by the end of 1956; by 
1958 the communes and the Great Leap Forward policies had been 
adopted by the Party. The period 1956-1958 is used here as a 
dividing point, with the explicit caveat that all such pin­
pointing is inexact and somewhat arbitrary.
3. The literature elicited by the Cultural Revolution is volumi­
nous. See, e.g., Chalmers Johnson, "The two Chinese revolu­
tions," China Quarterly, No. 39 (July-September, 1969) for a 
view emphasizing the Influence of Sino-Sovlet relations.
4. Policy positions often develop slowly, and changes in emphasis 
are difficult to pinpoint. They are, in addition, subject to 
geographical diversity because of deliberate experimentation, 
usually In Manchuria, level of Industrial development, and the 
degree of central control in various regions of China.
5. Arguments for consolidating the periodization of the Communist
regime into three periods, although along similar lines, are 
presented by Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's twenty 
years: A periodization," China Quarterly, No. 39 (July-Septem-
ber, 1969). The usefulness of the additional subdivisions for 
my study is evident in the following discussion.
6. Lenin assigned the unions four tasks also: transmission belt,
schools of communism (political education), schools of adminis­
tration, and defense of workers' interests. Discussion of the 
union role of defending workers' interests was soon dropped in 
the Soviet Union, and promoting production has long been a 
recognized task of the unions in both countries. In China the 
task of defending the workers is subsumed under the transmission 
belt function.
7. Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism, an infantile disorder," Selected
[1] no
Works, 871 (his emphasis). On the debates, see Margaret Dewar, 
Labour Policy in the USSR I9i7~1928.
8. This theme runs throughout Party writings on Party-union rela­
tions. See especially Chapter IV.
9. Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 7.
10. Ibid., Article 9.
11. "Constitution of the Trade Unions of the People's Republic of 
China," as published in Labour Laws and Regulations of the 
People's Republic of China.
12. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization In Communist China, 
Chapter IV.
13. "Constitution of the Trade Unions"; see also the explanatory 
speech by Hsu Chih-chen, in Seventh All-China Congress of 
Trade Unions. On developments between 1953 and 1956, see, 
e.g., "Speech by Lai Jo-y’u to the Fourth Plenum of the ACFTU," 
NCNA, January 13, 1956, in SCMP, No. 1212.
1^. See Hsii Chih-chen's speech on the revised constitution, in 
Eighth All-China Congress of Trade Unions.
15. Paul Harper, "Political roles of trade unions in Communist 
China," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1969, PP* 35- 
36.
16. A different labor system with extreme implications in that 
direction is that of Japan. See, e.g., Chie Nakane, Japanese 
Society, 24-25.
17. "Do not bend with the wind," JMJP, October 11, 1956, in SCMP,
No. 1400.
18. For Chinese Communist discussions of the mass line, see Liu 
Shao-ch'i, On the Party; Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Report on the 
Rectification Campaign; Yen Ling, "What is the Party's mass 
line?" Chenqchih Hsuehhsi, No. 6 (1955), in ECMM, No. 11 
(October 24,1955)• For the best secondary analysis, see 
James Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China.
19. Quoted by Andre Malraux, Anti-Memoirs, 379-
20. Schurmann, "Organizational contrasts between Communist China 
and the Soviet Union," in Kurt London, ed.. Unity and Contradic­
tion. On the small group in Chinese politics in general, see 
Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, 174-175; 
and John Lewis, Leadership in Communist China, 157-160. On
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the small group in union work, see Kung-hui hsiao-tsu chang 
kungtso (Work of the Trade Union Sma11Group Leader); and 
KJJP, August 6. 1965. in SCMP, No. 352^
21. E.g., NCNA, April 29, 1951, in SCMP, No. 101; NCNA, January 3, 
1953, in SCMP, No. ^88; Shang-hai Chieh-fang Jih-pao, April 8, 
1953, in SCMP, No. 56^4.
22. "Basic experiences of Wusan factory trade union movement," 
NCNA, January 3, 1953, in SCMP, No. 488.
23. The major analysis of Chinese incentive policies has been done 
by Charles Hoffman. See especially Work Incentive Practices 
and Policies in the People's Republic of China.
24. Dwight H. Perkins, Market Control and Planning in Communist 
China, 147-148.
25. The general distinction between model worker and worker acti­
vist is that of production excellence versus political 
activity. A union activist is a full-time worker who does 
union work in his spare time.
26. See, e.g., Article II8 of the Soviet Constitution.
27. For one discussion of why "socialist competition" is a contra­
diction in terms, and of Marx's opposition to piece wages, see 
Isaac Deutscher, "Socialist competition," Foreign Affairs,
XXX (April 1952).
28. Abram Bergson, Real National Income of Soviet Russia Since 
1928, 252ff; Janet Chapman, Real Wages in Soviet Russia Since 
T92F, 144-145, 176-177.
29. On the allocation of labor in Communist China, see Christopher
Howe, Employment and Economic Growth in Urban China 1949-1957, 
especially Part Two: "Employment Policy and Administration."
II. The Honeymoon Period, 1949-1952
1. The Marxist-Leninist doctrinal advantage of socialization is 
that it eliminates class divisions within society and thereby 
maximizes the production potential of each individual. The 
realization of that potential also depends on the reflection 
of that socialization in the political consciousness of all 
the members of society, i.e., it depends on all members of 
society becoming good socialists and ultimately good communists. 
The practical value of socialization of the means of production 
is that it allows centralized distribution of resources and
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production in accordance with economic planning and priorities.
2. Industrial apparatus valued at more than two billion dollars 
was taken from Manchuria by the Russians. Arthus G. Ashbrook, 
"Main lines of Chinese Communist economic policy," in Economic 
Profile of Mainland China, 18.
3. "The democratic reform movement in Central South China," a 
series of articles from Hankow Ch'angchiang Jihpao and Canton 
Nanfang Jihpao, in CB, No. 115; Liu Tzu-chiu, "On the belated 
introduction of the lessons of democratic reform in factories 
and mines," KJJP, September 12, 1951, in CB, No. 123; KJJP, 
September 25, 1952, in CB, No. 220; Euchlnic Huang, "Organizing 
a new labor union," China Monthly Review, January 1951.
k. Hsu Chih-chen, "Report on the amendment to the constitution of 
the trade unions of the People's Republic of China," in Seventh 
All-China Congress of Trade Unions.
5. KJJP editorial, January 1, 1951, in SCMP, No. kk; NCNA, March 
^TT951, in SCMP, No. 80.
6. NCNA, February 10, 1953, in SCMP, No. 513.
7. During the period 19^9-1952, 135,600 workers were promoted to 
cadre positions in the Party, the government and other organs 
and 124,500 were promoted to administrative and technical po­
sitions in enterprises. NCNA, April 24, 1953, in SCMP, No.
559. In 1949 there were almost no industrial workers in the 
Party; by 1956 there were over one-and-one-half million.
J.M.H. Lindbeck, "Transformation in the Chinese Communist 
Party," in Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism, 89; 
Lewis, Leadership in Communist China\108. By the end of 1952 
a total of 450,000 union members had become Party members and 
another 650,000 had joined the Communist Youth League. NCNA, 
April 24, 1953, in SCMP. No. 559.
8. Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China, Articles 
5 and 6.
9. Li Li-san, How to Manage a Factory; Chen Yung-wen, "Democratic 
management in public enterprises," People's China, I, 9 (May 1, 
1950). See also Schurmann, Ideology and Organization; 
Schurmann, "Organizational Contrasts Between Communist China 
and the Soviet Union."
10. Chen Yung-wen, "Democratic management," 10.
11. "Labour-Capital Consultative Councils in private enterprises," 
in Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China Together 
with Other Relevant Documents.
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12. Lao~tzu kuanhsi yu chit'i hot'ung (Labor—Capital Relations and 
Collective Agreements); "Labor-capital relations in Shanghai," 
Shanghai News, October 29, 1950, in CB_, No. 29 (November 22, 
1950).
13. "Regulations governing the procedures for the settlement of 
labor disputes," NCNA, November 25, 1950, in SCMP, No. 18.
lA. See also Joyce K. Kallgren, "Social welfare and China's indus~ 
trial workers," in Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in 
Action.
15. "Labor insurance regulations" and "Explanation of some points 
In the labor insurance regulations," NCNA, March 2k, 1951, In 
CB, No. 66.
16. Labour Insurance in New China, 31•
17. JMJP, May 1, 1955, in C£, No. 363-
18. KJJP, July 20, 1956, in SCMP, No. 1359-
19. "Resist-U.S., Aid-Korea movement to be integrated with produc­
tion improvement," report by Chen Shao-min at the third plenary 
session of the first National Committee of Textile Trade 
Unions, August 21, 1951. NCNA, September 14, 1951, in SCMP,
No. 178.
20. NCNA, April 21, 1951, in SCMP, No. 97.
21. NCNA, February 10, 1953, in SCMP, No. 513.
22. A series of articles is translated in SCMP, No. 87 (March 22-24, 
1951) and No. 117 (June 15-16, 1951). See also Hong Kong Ta^ 
Kung Pao, March 22, 1951, in CB, No. 99. As a point of inter­
est, the Ma Heng-chang brigade has been mentioned again recent­
ly. Ma himself is now a chief engineer and his team of lathe 
turners has reportedly overfulfilled its quota every year for 
the past twenty-four years. “Outstanding team of lathe turners 
maintains record in China," NCNA Harbin, October 13, 1973, in 
SCMP, No. 5482.
23. NCNA, February 10, 1953, in SCMP, No. 513; Liu Tzu-chiu,"0n 
problems of Party leadership over union organs,Hsuehhsi, No. 
10 (October 2, 1955), in ECMM, No. 14; Lai Jo-yu, "Report on 
trade union work in China," and Hsu Chih-chen, "Report on the 
amendment to the constitution of the trade unions of the 
People's Republic of China," both in Seventh All-China Congress 
of Trade Unions.
24. NCNA, February 10, 1953, in SCMP, No. 513.
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25. Paul Harper, "Political roles," I76-I78.
26. Ibid., 175.
27. Lai Jo-yu, "Report on trade union work in China," in Seventh 
All-China Congress of Trade Unions; KJJP editorial. January 1,
J951 , in SCMP, No. 44; "Notice on the question of rectifying 
the work style of trade union organizations and trade union 
cadres," issued by the ACFL on August 11, 1950 and reprinted 
in Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, August 15, 1950; KJJP editorial and 
accompanying article on the subject of the second plenum of 
the ACFL Sixth Executive Committee, February 11, 1953, in 
SCMP. No. 513.
28. Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 3.
29. "Explanation of some points in the labor insurance regulations," 
NONA, February 27, 1951» in CB, No. 66. The main spokesman
for the ACFL during the san-fan and wu-fan campaigns, for ex­
ample, was Liu Ning-yi.
30. "Speech by Comrade Li Li-san," in Eighth National Congress of 
the Communist Party of China, II, 255. See also G.L.V. Hooton, 
"The Future of Trades-Unionism in China," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, XVIII, Ik (June 16, 1955). At the same time it should 
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in its earlier years so that Li's role as a scapegoat is pos­
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position as a member of the Party's Central Committee and its 
Standing Committe; in 1956-1958 he was deputy director of the 
industrial committee of the Central Committee; in 1962 he be­
came secretary of the North China Regional Bureau. Directory 
of Chinese Communist Officials, I963, I966. Reportedly, how­
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lutionary revisionists," March I968, in£B, No. 874.
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both in SCMP. No. 513.
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speeches by Lai Jo-yu during 1956 and 1957.
25. Ezra A. Vogel, "From revolutionary to semi-bureaucrat: The
'regularization' of cadres," China Quarterly, No. 29 (January- 
March 1967).
26. See Chapter V. The article "Sources of labor discontent in 
China," erroneously states that the system appeared for the 
first time in the sixties, apparently following the implica­
tions to that effect in Chinese articles on the subject, 
especially Peking Review, IX, 3 (January 14, I966), "Across 
the Land" section.
27. "Sources of labor discontent in China," 3.
28. See, e.g., "Participation in both industry and farming work is 
an important reform in the labor system," Chungkuo Fangchih,
No. 1 (January 10, 1965), in SCMM, No. 465; Chang Ho-wei, "The 
worker-peasant labor system in finance and trade departments," 
Hsin Chienshe. Nos. 1-2 (February 20, 1966), in SCMM, No. 534.
29. See, e.g., "Questions and answers on trade union membership," 
KJJP, November 23, 1962, in SCMP, No. 2885.
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the countryside after a number of years in certain types of 
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ers in the cotton textile and silk-reeling enterprises should 
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and when sent back to the countryside at 26, they are still 
able-bodied labor power." "Participation in both industry and 
farming work is an important reform in the labor system" (cited 
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the generally higher standard of living enjoyed by workers than 
by peasants, the threat of rotation to the countryside may it­
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31. "Sources of labor discontent in China," 10; "Information about 
Liu Shao-ch'i in the system of temporary labor and contract 
system," by Red Rebel Team, Ministry of Labor, and Revolution­
ary Rebel Team of Red Workers and Staff Members, Ministry of 
Labor, January 1, 1967, published by the Red 'Criticizing Liu 
Shao-ch'i' Combat Corps of Canton, January 1968, in SCMM,
No. 616. Ma Wen-jui was also a victim of the Cultural
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Central Committee in 1969.
Vi It. The Reappearance of the 
Trade Unions, 1973
1. According to Chin Fu-yao, cultural officer of the People's 
Republic of China's embassy in Australia, the unions had con­
tinued to exist but had been inactive. Personal communication.
2. E.g., "Chinese workers delegation visits Albania," Peking Re- 
view. No. 21 (May 26, 1972); and "Peking trade union congress," 
Peking Review, No. 17 (April 27, 1973), for reference to a 
recent Chinese workers delegation to Japan.
3. "Strive to fulfill the historical mission of the working class," 
Hung Ch'i, No. 9 (September 3, 1973), in SCMM, No. 760.
Ij. Rensselaer W. Lee 111, "The politics of technology in Communist 
China," in Johnson, ed.. Ideology and Politics in Contemporary 
China.
5. E.g., "Living standards in China improve," Peking Review, No.
40 (September 30, 1971). A more recent article makes the ex­
plicit point that workers' output, quality and rejection rates 
are publicly posted "to draw attention to outstanding work for 
others to emulate, not as a 'material incentive.'" "Socialist 
industry--The workers are the masters," Peking Review, No. 28 
(July 13, 1973).
6. See especially Carl Riskin, "Maoism and motivation: Work in­
centives in China," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, V 
(July 1973).
7. E.g., "Living standards in China improve," (cited in note 5
above). For more detailed chronological comparison of wages 
in one factory, see Mitch Meisner, "Report From China: The
Shenyang transformer factory—A profile," China Quarterly, No. 
52 (October-December 1972), 731.
8. Barry Richman, Industrial Society in Communist China, 80lt.
9. Riskin, "Maoism and motivation."
10. Meisner, "Report from China." According to Meisner, workers 
averaged 6A yuan per month, state cadres and technicians 60 
yuan per month. A number of articles in the Chinese press 
emphasize that the Party chairman may or may not earn slightly 
more than skilled workers and that Party committee members
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dustry—The workers are the masters" (cited in note 5 above).
11. This reemergence is discussed in the previous chapter. For a 
discussion of this change as reflected in Chinese literature, 
especially the role of veteran workers, see my "Heroes and 
villains in Chinese literature, 1968-1972," World Review, forth- 
coming.
12. This point is suggested by Riskin, "Maoism and motivation."
See also Riskin, "Small industry and the Chinese model of de­
velopment," China Quarterly, No. ^6 (April-June 1971); Jon 
Sigurdson, "Rural industry—A traveler's view," China Quarterly, 
No. 50 (April-June 1972). For an overview, see Wheelwright and 
MacFarlane, The Chinese Road to Socialism. For recent ovei— 
views, see, e.g., Peking Review, January 7, 1972; Audrey Donni- 
thorne, "China's cellular economy," China Quarterly, No. 52 
(October-December 1972).
13- In an extreme form, work groups may be remunerated on the basis 
of group output, with autonomy to decide each worker's share on 
the basis of such, criteria as work effort, need, cooperative­
ness, etc. As Riskin indicates, however, application in this 
form has been limited in factories because a policy of time 
wages rather than collective bonuses has been in effect. Ris­
kin, "Maoism and motivation."
H. On this general theme, see, e.g., Wang Hung-wen's remarks to 
the Tenth Party Congress. On this general theme applied to 
workers, see, e.g., Wu Kung-wen, "Training worker-cadres is a 
task assigned us by history," JMJP, July 10, 1973, in SCMP,
No. 5^22; KMJP, May 13, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5382. See also 
Take the Road of the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in Training 
Technicians from Among the Workers.
15. E.g., NCNA Tientsin. May 11, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5379-
16. Jen Wen, "Road of training technicians from among the workers," 
Peking Review. No. 32 (August 6, 1971); JMJP, October 6, 1973, 
in SCMP, No. 5481.
17. In 1971 revisionism was criticized by repudiating Liu Shao-ch'i; 
in 1973 revisionism was attacked in general until after the 
Tenth Party Congress when Lin Piao was singled out. For 1971 
see, e.g., "Motivation behind heroic deeds," Peking Review,
No. 50 (December 10, 1971); "Fourth five-year plan: First
year's success," Peking Review, No. 1 (January 7, 1972). On 
the intensified campaign to study Mao and Marxism in 1973, see 
Chang Fu-heng, "We workers must strive to study revolutionary 
theories," Hung Ch'i, No. 5 (May 1, 1973), in SCMM, No. 753; 
"Dockers in central China port study Marxism-Leninism," NCNA
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Wuhan, October 20, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5^86.
18. JMJP, April 16, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5363- See also, e.g.,
KMJP, May 30, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5393
19. See especially JMJP, July 8, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5^19-
20. On the 1973 upsurge in the campaign to learn from Tach'ing,
see especially the series of articles in £B, No. 979 (March 2, 
1973). For an analysis of the relation between general policy 
and fluctuations in the media prominence of the Tach'ing model, 
see N.J. Knight, "Tachai and Tach'ing in the ideology and or­
ganization of Communist China: 196^-1973," Honors Thesis,
University of Queensland, 1973.
21. Jen Wen, "Road of training technicians from among the workers," 
(cited in note 16 above); "Socialist industry—The workers are 
the masters" (cited in note 5 above).
22. Richman, Industrial Society, writing about 1966.
23. "Tap potential. Increase production." Hung Ch'i. No. 10
(October 1, 1972), in SCMM, No. 7^0; see also, e.g., Chi Ching, 
"Practising economy: A principle of socialist economies,"
Peking Review, No. I8 (May k, 1973).
2k. See also Lee, "The politics of technology in Communist China." 
This kind of cooperation is potentially facilitated by the 01 
ganization of Chinese unions as plant unions.
25. Paul Harper, "Workers' participation."
26. KMJP, April 20, 1973, and KMJP, April 22, 1973, both in SCMP, 
No. 5366. KMJP, May 9, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5380.
27. Meisner reports that in the Shenyang transformer factory he 
visited in 1972, the Revolutionary Committee was established 
in 1968 and that sixteen of twenty-eight members were "from 
the masses." Meisner, "Report from China." According to a 
recent Peking Review article on the Shanghai Watch Company, 
the Party committee is entirely composed of workers with the 
exception of the Secretary (concurrently chairman of the Revo­
lutionary Committee), and the Revolutionary Committee is 
entirely composed of workers except for one engineer and the 
chairman. "Socialist industry-~-The workers are the masters," 
(cited in note 5 above).
"Over 5,000 new party members of Anshan Iron and Steel Com­
pany," [among workers, cadres and technical personnel] KMJP, 
June 29, 1973; "Large number of new Party members among 
Shanghai workers," [33,000 since the Ninth Congress in I969]
28.
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NCNA Shanghai, July 1, 1973; "Vigorous new Party members in 
Peking," [60,000, two-thirds of them workers and poor and 
lower-middle peasants] NCNA Peking, July 1, 1973; all three 
in SCMP, No. 5^13.
29. No single list has come to my attention. See the series of
reports from the provincial trade union conferences in the 
following 1973 Issues of SCMP: Nos. 5368, 539^, 5^04, 5413,
5418, 5428, 5440, 5448, 5462, 5476.
30. Meisner, "Report from China";'*Social ist industry—The workers 
are the masters" (cited in note 5 above).
31. See the series of reports from provincial trade union confer­
ences listed in note 29.
32. "Socialist industry—The workers are the masters" (cited in 
note 5 above); "Strive to fulfill the historical mission of 
the working class" (cited in note 3 above).
33. Sources for the rest of this chapter are primarily the series 
of reports cited in note 29; also "Strive to fulfill the his­
torical mission of the working class" (cited in note 3 above); 
"How basic level Peking trade union works," NCNA, April 24, 
1973, in SCMP, No. 5368.
34. "New worker cadres," Peking Review, May 4, 1973; "Actively 
train cadres from among workers," JMJP, July 23, 1973, in 
SCMP, No. 5428.
35. An alternate hypothesis is that the mass organizations are
being resurrected to support the Party against government or­
gans. See, e.g., Henry S. Bradsher, "China: The radical
offensive." Asian Survey. XIII, 11 (November 1973).
IX. Summary and Conclusions
1. The entrenchment of higher political officials in China before 
the Cultural Revolution is well documented and is explicit in 
Mao's speech on contradictions among the people as well as the 
Cultural Revolution itself. For an interesting view of efforts 
by "the people" to maximize their individual and personal in­
terests by learning to use the developing rules of the game in 
Chinese society, see Michel Oksenberg, "The institutionaliza­
tion of the Chinese Communist revolution," China (Quarterly,
No. 36 (October-December 1968).
On the Maoist strategy, e.g., "China's road to socialist in­
dustrialization," Peking Review, No. 43 (October 24, 1969);
2.
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for perhaps the most enthusiastic Western scholarly descrip­
tion, see E.L. Wheelwright and Bruce MacFarlane, The Chinese 
Road to Socialism.
3. For a discussion of bureaucratic decentralization, market de­
centralization and "computopia" as alternative responses to 
these problems see, e.g., Egon Neuberger, "Libermanism, com­
putopia, and visible hand," American Economic Review: Papers
and Proceedings, May 1966, 131-1
h. On over-urbanization as a general problem in developing coun­
tries, see, e.g., Fred W. Riggs, "Modernization and political 
problems: Some developmental prerequisites," in Willard A.
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